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Abstract:
In the United States, police officers are granted a license to use lethal
force and are subsequently exonerated from personal criminal liability for
fatal killings, particularly when the victim is an African American. This
Article advances the normative claim that the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence, including the “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, protects the victims of police homicides. Further, it
contends that the police use of lethal force against African Americans
constitutes “lynching”—a State-sponsored act of terror that supports
systemic racism. Finally, it posits that the Constitution mandates that the

1. J.D., Yale Law 1981; M.A., Oxford 1985; Distinguished Henry F. Bonura, Jr.
Professor, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. Thanks to Loyola students
Lindsey Freihoff, LaTreshia A. Hamilton, and Jillian Morrison; and to my colleagues at the
John Mercer Langston Writers Workshop.

[3]
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police use of lethal force be abolished—a transformative solution to save
Black lives and to achieve equal justice.

Introduction**
In Louisville, on March 13, 2020, Breonna Taylor, a twenty-six-yearold Black2 female emergency room technician, was slain while asleep in her
bed in her home.3 Taylor was killed by at least eight of the more than twenty
bullets fired by three white male plainclothes police officers who used a
battering ram to force open the door while raiding her home pursuant to a
no-knock warrant.4
In Minneapolis, on May 25, 2020, the media broadcasted a cellphone
video of four police officers detaining a Black male who was handcuffed and
lying face down in the street.5 One white6 male officer continuously pressed
his knee to the man’s neck, while two white male officers applied their knees
to his back and legs, as another male police officer looked on.7 The detained
man repeatedly cried out, “I can’t breathe.”8 The chokehold lasted for eight

2. This Article capitalizes the “B” in “Black,” when referring to Americans of the
African diaspora. See generally Kwame Anthony Appiah, Opinion, The Case for Capitalizing
the B in Black, THE ATLANTIC (June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-white/613159/; Dean Baquet et al., Uppercasing
‘Black’, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytco.com/press/uppercasing-black/
(announcing that the New York Times is capitalizing the word “Black” when describing
people and cultures of African origin). Throughout this Article, I intentionally interchange
the use of the words “Black” and “African American.
3. See Arian Campos-Flores et al., Police Killing of Breonna Taylor Fuels Calls to End
No-Knock Warrants, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/policekilling-of-breonna-taylor-fuels-calls-to-end-no-knock-warrants-11590332400. Black women
are victims of varying forms of police brutality, including fatal shootings, rape, and maiming.
See Mary-Elizabeth Murphy, Black Women Are the Victims of Police Violence, Too, WASH.
POST (July 24, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/
24/police-violence-happens-against-women-too/. See generally KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET
AL., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2016).
4. Campos-Flores et. al., supra note 2.
5. Evan Hill, 8 Minutes and 46 Seconds: How George Floyd Was Killed in Police
Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/georgefloyd-investigation.html?auth=login-email&login=email (George Floyd was arrested for
allegedly passing a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill)
6. This Article intentionally notes that the officers who kill Blacks, particularly Black
males, are white males, which raises masculinity issues that are beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry
Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009) (examining how
masculinity contests specifically, and masculinities studies generally, affect policing).
7. Hill, supra note 4.
8. Id.
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minutes and forty-six seconds, resulting in the man’s death.9 That person’s
name was George Floyd.10
In Atlanta, on June 12, 2020, Rayshard Brooks, a twenty-seven-yearold Black male, was shot and killed by a white male police officer.11 Brooks
was shot twice in the back as he ran away from two police officers. His
crime was “driving” while intoxicated, despite being asleep and parked in a
Wendy’s drive thru.12
The police killings of Rayshard Brooks, George Floyd, and Breonna
Taylor13 compel examination of the legality and the morality of the police
use of lethal force—raising disturbing questions about racial animus,
systemic racism, and institutional racism against Blacks.14 In response to
these questions, this Article contends that the police use of deadly force
serves two purposes: first, it terminates the life of a Black person, usually a
male, who refused to readily submit to police authority, and second, it
terrorizes Blacks and thereby reinforces white supremacy. Thus, the police
use of lethal force is both a moral issue and legal crisis that needs a
transformative solution.
The recent police killings of Blacks, along with similar recent
atrocities,15 have re-ignited the Black Lives Matter Movement (the
“Movement”).16 The Movement demands an end to racial injustice and

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Helena Oliviero et al., Who Was Rayshard Brooks?, THE ATL. J. CONST. (June 14,
2020), https://www.ajc.com/lifestyles/who-was-rayshard-brooks/lWjd3oZvR5D9QZywptiGkP/.
12. Id.
13. These recent questionable uses of lethal force join those of Michael Brown, Tamir
Rice, Trayvon Martin, Rodney King, and so many others.
14. See infra Part I, B.
15. For example, near Brunswick, Georgia, on February 23, 2020, Ahmaud Arbery, a
Black male, was jogging when two white males, claiming they acted as civilian law
enforcement, shot and killed him. See Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting
Death of Ahmaud Arbery, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/
ahmaud-arbery-shooting-georgia.html.
In Aurora, Colorado, on August 24, 2019, Elijah McClain, a 23-year-old Black male, while
walking home and unarmed, was stopped by white police officers. One officer placed
McClain into a carotid hold, cutting off the flow of oxygen to his brain. Paramedics gave
McClain ketamine to sedate him, while the officers held him down for fifteen minutes as
McClain went into cardiac arrest. McClain was declared brain dead on August 30, 2019. See
Stephanie Guerilus, After Elijah McClain Was Killed by Police, a Petition Signed by More
than 2M Seeks Justice, THE GRIO (June 24, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.aol.com/article/
news/2020/06/24/after-elijah-mcclain-was-killed-by-police-a-petition-signed-by-more-than2m-seeks-justice/24535890/
16. See Alicia Garza, A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement by Alicia Garza,
THE FEMINIST WIRE (Oct. 7, 2014), https://thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/;
Herstory, BLACKLIVESMATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/ (“Black Lives Matter
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oppression in America, with a particular emphasis on stopping police
brutality against Black people17 and eradicating systemic racism.18 The
Movement is now a global protest of the police use of lethal force against
Blacks.19
Unfortunately, the Movement faces a conundrum—(1) that police
officers20 are authorized to use deadly or “lethal force,”21 (2) that police
is an ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically
and intentionally targeted for demise. It is an affirmation of Black folks’ humanity, our
contributions to this society, and our resilience in the face of deadly oppression”). Parallel
components of the Movement are the #BlackGirlsMatter and #SayHerName movements. See
also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw et al., Black Girls Matter: Pushed Out, Overpoliced and
Underprotected, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM (2015), https://www.atlanticphilanthrop
ies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/BlackGirlsMatter_Report.pdf; Say Her Name, Resisting
Police Brutality Against Black Women, AFRICAN AM. POLICY FORUM (2015), http://
static1.squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/560c068ee4b0af26f72741df/1
443628686535/AAPF_SMN_Brief_Full_singles-min.pdf.
17. White male police officers’ killings of Black males raise particular concern. See
Sandhya Somashekhar et al., Black and Unarmed, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/08/08/black-and-unarmed (noting that unarmed Black
males are seven times more likely than whites to die by police gunfire).
18. “Systemic racism,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the conscious and
unconscious institutionalization of and the continuation of the oppression of Blacks. See infra
Part III, B. Another example of systemic racism is the failure to properly investigate and to
solve homicides of Blacks, from any perpetrator. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery et al., Murder
with Impunity: An Unequal Justice, WASH. POST (July 25, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/graphics/2018/investigations/black-homicides-arrests/?noredirect=on&utm_term
=.281edee23750. See generally Paul Butler, Race and Adjudication, 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 211-26 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (2018), http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/10_Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3._Race-and-Adjudication.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Q6N-2JX3]; Terry Gross, Policing Is the ‘Avatar of American Racism,’
Marshall Project Journalist Says, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: FRESH AIR (June 10, 2020, 2:09 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/873564620/policing-is-an-avatar-of-american-racism-mar
shall-project-journalist-says.
19. See infra Part I, B.
20. “Police officer(s),” for purposes of this Article, is defined as law enforcement
personnel, who maintain public order, safety and health, and enforcement of laws and possess
executive, judicial, and legislative powers, including police officers, sheriffs, prison guards,
security guards, highway patrols, militia, and people acting in such roles.
21. “Lethal force,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the amount of force, deployed
by a police officer, that is likely to cause either serious bodily harm or death to another person,
or actually causes serious injury or death to another person. Lethal force includes shooting of
firearms, chokehold, strangulation, stun guns aka Tasers, shooting rubber bullets, attack dogs,
the injection of ketamine, aggravated assault, simple battery, no-knock raids, and failing to
come to a person’s aid in a timely manner. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATT’Y GEN. OCTOBER
17, 1995 MEMORANDUM ON RESOLUTION 14 (ATTACHMENT): COMMENTARY REGARDING THE
USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN NON-CUSTODIAL SITUATIONS https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/
attorney-general-october-17-1995-memorandum-resolution-14-attachment-1 (last updated
Mar. 8, 2017) (defining deadly force as the use of any force that is “likely to cause death or
serious physical injury”).

BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS

Fall 2020

BLACK LIVES MATTER

7

officers not only kill people,22 but the legal system condones those killings,
particularly when the victims are Black,23 and (3) that police officers who
kill Blacks are seldom prosecuted and are rarely, if ever, convicted for
homicide.24 Such a lack of accountability of deadly force results in negative
consequences—injustice for the victims and their families,25 harm and fear
for future victims,26 and increased risk for police officers.27
In response to this crisis, this Article uniquely challenges the
constitutionality of the police use of lethal force28 by analyzing the policies
and Supreme Court doctrines that permit the killing of innocent Blacks.29 It

22. See infra Part I, A.
23. See infra Part I, C.
24. See infra Part I, C. The police officers who killed George Floyd and Rayshard
Brooks have been arrested and indicted for the killings, while only one officer was charged
in the case of Breonna Taylor for “wanton endangerment.” Of note, no officers were charged
with her actual killing. See Brittany Shammas et al., Murder Charges Filed Against All Four
Officers in George Floyd’s Death as Protests Against Bias Policing Continue, WASH. POST
(June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/03/george-floyd-police-off
icers-charges/; Faith Karimi et al., Atlanta Officers Turn Themselves in on Charges in the
Death of Rayshard Brooks, CNN (last updated June 18, 2020), https://www.cnn.
com/2020/06/18/us/rayshard-brooks-atlanta-shooting-thursday/index.html. See Richard A.
Oppel Jr. et al., Here’s What You Need to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES
(July 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html; see Rukmini
Callimachi, et al., Fired Officer is Indicted in Breonna Taylor Case; Protestors Wanted
Stronger Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/
us/breonna-taylor-officer-indicted.html.
25. No Accountability for Police Shootings, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://eji.org/news/history-racial-injustice-no-accountability-for-police-shootings/.
26. See generally Maquita Peters, Being Black in America: “We Have a Place in This
World Too,” NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 5, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/05/
867060621/being-black-in-america-we-have-a-place-in-this-world-too; Amanda Graham et
al., Race and Worrying About Police Brutality: The Hidden Injuries of Minority Status in
America, VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 549–573 (2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/15564886.2020.1767252 (reporting on a nationwide study that found that Blacks
are five times more likely to fear police brutality than whites). Racial profiling has a
profoundly negative psychological impact on Black families, who fear for their safety and
that of their family members and friends. See, e.g., Chuck Henson, Reflections on Ferguson:
What’s Wrong with Black People?, 80 MO. L. REV. 1013, 1013–19 (2015).
27. Lawrence Rosenthal, Police Violence Is Mostly Rooted in Fear. Ignoring That Makes
Reform Harder, NBC NEWS (June 12, 2020, 3:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
think/opinion/police-violence-mostly-rooted-fear-ignoring-makes-reform-harder-ncna1230266;
Martin Kaste, Police Officers Fear More For Their Safety, Pew Survey Finds, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Jan. 11, 2017, 4:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/11/509361596/police-offic
ers-fear-more-for-their-safety-pew-survey-finds.
28. See infra Part III, A (utilizing Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence to
challenge the Supreme Court Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” jurisprudence views
this issue as one of police officer’s accountability and the reasonability of using such force).
29. See infra Part III. This Article challenges the constitutionality of police use of lethal
force, focusing on the process that legalizes killings and not the personal accountability of the
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advances the normative claim that the police use of lethal force is an
unconstitutional violation of the victims’ right to life against Statesponsored30 executions31 under the “Cruel and Unusual Punishment”
Clause32 of the Eighth Amendment.33 Further, it contends that the police use
of lethal force is modern-day “lynching”34—an act of terror that sustains

perpetrator. While this Article argues that racism is baked into policing policies in this
country, a police officer who kills a person should not be permitted to naively claim that they
were just following protocol. Cf. PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (Guénaël
Mettraux, ed., 2008) (in the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders, the court refused to accept the
just-following-orders defense to the Holocaust atrocities). See also Jamie Ehrlich et al.,
Federal Judge Pens Scathing Opinion on Qualified Immunity: ‘Let Us Waste No Time in
Righting This Wrong’, CNN (Aug. 4, 2020, 9:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/
04/politics/qualified-immunity-federal-judge/index.html (challenging qualified immunity’s
application to police use of lethal force).
30. “State-sponsored,” for purposes of this Article, refers to actions authorized by and
carried out on behalf of a State or the Federal governments.
31. “Execution(s),” for purposes of this Article, refers to a killing of a person by a state
actor, that is, a person acting under the color of law, such as when a police officer kills a
person during the course of performing their official duties. This Article seeks to distinguish
a “wrongful” execution, such as the police use of lethal force versus a “rightful” execution,
such as when the State “executes” a person in compliance with constitutionally-prescribed
due process and in a humane manner, such as carrying out of a sentence of death of a
condemned person, including by lethal injection, electrocution, gas inhalation, hanging, and
firing squad. See infra Part III, A.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted”).
See infra, Part III, A. This Article refers to this and its ancillary constitutional provisions as
“death penalty jurisprudence,” as defined, for purposes of this Article as “all constitutional
and fundamental rights provisions, such as and including Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process, which protect a person against Government infringement of the sanctity of a
person’s life.”
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Court’s Eighth Amendment death penalty
jurisprudence is plagued by racial bias, resulting in innocent Blacks being sentenced to death
and executed. See NAACP Death Penalty Fact Sheet, NAACP (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.
naacp.org/latest/naacp-death-penalty-fact-sheet/; Racial Bias, NAT’L COAL. TO ABOLISH THE
DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/pages/racial-bias (last visited July 23, 2020). See
also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1154 (1994) (Justice Blackmun dissenting, proclaimed
that “[e]ven under the most sophisticated death penalty statutes, race continues to play a major
role in determining who shall live and who shall die.”); Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 297 (1987) (holding that a pattern of racial disparities in the death penalty did not violate
an individual’s constitutional right of “equal protection of the law”). Cf. Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence relative to the use of lethal force in custodial cases. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger,
Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV L. REV 6 (2003) (providing one of the most comprehensive
reviews of inmate litigation including those that pertained to conditions of confinement in
violation of the Eighth Amendment); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions and the
Eighth Amendment, 84 NYU L. REV. 881 (2009) (examining when prison conditions would
qualify as either “cruel” or “unusual” and how cruelty would be captured doctrinally for
Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement analysis).
34. “Lynching,” for purposes of this Article, is defined as State-sanctioned executions
aka punishments, which, under the pretext of administering justice, without trial, tortured and
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systemic racism which presently and continuously35 kills, traumatizes, and
subrogates Blacks.36
This Article tests the thesis that the Eighth Amendment’s death penalty
jurisprudence mandates the abolition of the police use of lethal force, in three
parts, seriatim. Part I explores the Black Lives Matter Movement’s demand
for equal justice and an end to systemic racism, and it describes a conundrum
that the Movement faces. Next, Part II provides a transformative solution—
the absolute abolition of the police use of lethal force. Part III argues that
the solution is constitutionally mandated, and it is necessary to save Black
lives and achieve equal justice.

I. Unequal Justice
In response to overwhelming evidence, including video recordings of
unjustified and unaccountable police killings of Blacks,37 Part I explains the
legal challenges that the Movement faces in achieving the goal of equal
justice.38 It examines how police policies and practices promote the
excessive use of lethal force, and it analyzes the true meaning of the phrase
“Black Lives Matter.” Lastly, it presents a conundrum facing the
Movement—that despite the protests, police officers have and will continue
to get away with killing Blacks, as illustrated in the gruesome, yet
underreported, police mass shootings of Blacks in New Orleans during
Hurricane Katrina, which this Article refers to as the Katrina Massacre.39

killed African American males, terrorizing Blacks and thereby maintaining white supremacy
in the economic, social and political spheres. Historically, the most commonly utilized form
of lynching was noose-hanging a Black man from a tree. See infra Part III, C.
35. See generally F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND
QUESTIONS (4th ed. 2015); Larry Spruill, Slave Patrols, “Packs of Negro Dogs” and Policing
Black Communities, 53 PHYLON 42–66 (2016).
36. See, e.g., To Make Them Stand in Fear, KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 141 (1956) (“here, then, was the way to
produce the perfect slave: accustom him to rigid discipline, demand from him unconditional
submission, impress upon him his innate inferiority, develop in him a paralyzing fear of white
men, train him to adopt the master’s code of good behavior, and instill in him a sense of
complete dependence”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 148. See also Lisette Voytko, Viral
Video Of Colorado Cops Holding Black Family At Gunpoint Ignites Outrage, Calls For
Reform, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2020, 12:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/
2020/08/04/viral-video-of-colorado-cops-holding-black-family-at-gunpoint-ignites-outragecalls-for-reform/#335e71c074c5.
37. See generally Andrea Castillo, How Two Black Women in L.A. Helped Build Black
Lives Matter from Hashtag to Global Movement, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-21/black-lives-matter-los-angeles-patriss
e-cullors-melina-abdullah. See also Crenshaw, supra note 15; Garza, supra note 15.
38. See supra note 15.
39. See infra Part I, C, 2.
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A. Kill Policy
Police killings have raised unique concerns following widelypublicized, controversial police shootings of Black children, females, and
males.40 Police officers kill Blacks at rates more than twice those of whites.41
Particularly, a white male police officer is most likely to fatally shoot a
person who is a young Black male.42
Police killings of Blacks reflect two problems: one is systemic racism
and the other is the police policy that authorizes police officers to use lethal
force. We begin with an analysis of the policies that license police officers
to kill.
We start with detailed statistics of police killings in general. In the
United States, officers kill people in many ways,43 most commonly by
shooting.44 In 2019 alone, police officers fatally shot over one thousand

40. See, e.g., Mic, 23 Ways You Could Be Killed If You Are Black in America, YOUTUBE
(July 13, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_VaNhI4CLo (showing video of the
faces of many Black victims of police shootings and celebrities calling for change); Brittany
Spanos, Beyoncé, Rihanna, Alicia Keys: How to Get Killed While Black, ROLLING STONE (July
13, 2016, 9:22 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/beyonce-rihannaalicia-keys-how-to-get-killed-while-black-81976/ (showing video of the faces of many Black
victims of police shootings and celebrities calling for change); see also Timothy Williams,
Study Supports Suspicion That Police Are More Likely to Use Force on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES
(July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/study-supports-suspicion-that-policeuse-of-force-is-more-likely-for-blacks.html?_r=0.
41. See The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN, https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database
(last visited Apr. 23, 2019) (noting the rate of death for young Black men was five times
higher than white men of the same age, out of the 1,146 people killed by police in 2015); Law
Enforcement and Violence: The Divide Between Black and White Americans, ASSOC. PRESSNORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS RES., http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%
20Reports/law-enforcement-and-violence-the-divide-between-black-and-white-americans08
03-9759.aspx.
42. See Ryan Gabrielson et al., Deadly Force, in Black and White: A ProPublica
Analysis of Killings by Police Shows Outsize Risk for Young Black Males, PROPUBLICA (Oct.
10, 2014, 11:07 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-white;
David Johnson et al., Officer Characteristics and Racial Disparities in Fatal Officer-Involved
Shootings, 116 PNAS (July 22, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1903856116 (last updated
Aug. 6, 2019).
43. See supra note 20 (listing the various types of lethal force). See also
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org (providing an Excel database of the forms of officer caused
death, the majority of which are from gun violence).
44. See The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killin
gs-us-database (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
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people.45 By comparison, police officers have fatally shot more people in
the last eighteen months than the total number of people that the States have
executed for capital punishment in the last forty-four years.46 This startling
fact demands that we examine the constitutionality of police killings and
whether the police use of lethal force passes constitutional scrutiny.
Police policies direct police officers to use deadly force, but only as a
last resort.47 Specifically, officers are guided by their individual departments
and are expected to use only the amount of force necessary to mitigate an
incident, make an arrest, or protect themselves or others from harm.48 Police
use of force should include base levels of verbal and physical restraint, nonlethal force, and lethal force;49 yet, instead, they are permitted and trained to

45. Fatal Force, See 1,004 People Have Been Shot and Killed by Police in the Past Year,
WASH. POST (July 16, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/
police-shootings-database/.
46. Executions Overview, Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/number-ofexecutions-by-state-and-region-since-1976 (documenting that from 1976 to June 2020, there
were 1,518 executions, of which 1,338 were by lethal injection, 163 by electrocution, 11 by
gas inhalation, 3 by hanging, and 3 by firing squad). The number of annual police killings
has been consistent over the last several years and is usually high compared to other countries.
See Rob Picheta et al., American Police Shoot, Kill and Imprison More People Than Other
Developed Countries. Here’s the Data, CNN (June 8, 2020, 7:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/06/08/us/us-police-floyd-protests-country-comparisons-intl/index.html.
47. See WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DEADLY FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES,
AMNESTY INT’L (2015), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/aiusa_
deadlyforcereportjune2015-1.pdf (presenting a state-by-state legislative survey on police use
of lethal force statutes in the United States and noting that U.S. law does not comply with
international standards which limit police use of lethal force to instances necessary to protect
against the threat of death or serious injury); see, e.g., Chicago Police Department General
Order G03-02, Use of Force (Issue Date: Feb. 28, 2020, Effective Date: Feb. 29, 2020),
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff-44306f3da
7b28a19.pdf?hl=true. See also Libor Jany, Minneapolis Police Reveal Changes to Use-ofForce Policy, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2016, 9:40 AM), http://www.startribune.com/minneapolispolice-reveal-changes-to-use-of-force-policy/389509371/. Further, several States allow
police officers to kill a person who is attempting to escape from a prison or jail. See infra
Part III, A, 2, discussing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (stating that deadly force
can be used to prevent escape if “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers or others”).
Additionally, many such States allow private citizens to use lethal force if they are carrying
out law enforcement activities. See generally Frances Robles, The Citizen’s Arrest Law Cited
in Arbery’s Killing Dates Back to the Civil War, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery-citizen-arrest-law-georgia.html (discussing Georgia’s
citizen’s arrest law that arose in 1863).
48. See Chicago Police Department General Order G03-02, supra note 46. See, Jany,
supra note 46.
49. See, e.g., Policy on Use of Lethal Force, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-the-fbis-policy-on-the-use-of-deadly-force-by-its-
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use deadly or lethal force, including shooting and chokeholds, under said
“justifiable” circumstances.50 Moreover, regardless of the official or
unofficial restrictions and controversies on the use of lethal force, a police
officer might and, often times does, violate those limitations.51 To this day,
there are no methods to objectively control police brutality.
Additionally, those lethal force policies are rationalized by the danger
narrative: the inherent dangers that police officers face while policing.52
However, this narrative has been debunked,53 as very few police officers die
in the line of duty.54 For example, in 2019, eighty-nine police officers died
in the line of duty, forty-eight officers of which died as a result of felonious

special-agents (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) (“FBI special agents may use deadly force only
when necessary—when the agent has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses
an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the agent or another person. If
feasible, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the special agent is given prior to the
use of deadly force”).
50. See Overview of Police Use of Force, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/overview-police-use-force (reporting that [t]he International
Association of Chiefs of Police has described use of force as the “amount of effort required
by police to compel compliance by an unwilling subject”). “Justifiable” circumstances exist
when the officer reasonably believes the subject poses a significant threat of serious bodily
injury or death to themselves or others. Lethal force is judged by an objective reasonableness
standard—not subjective as to what the officer’s intent might have been, and, therefore, must
be judged from the perspective of a “reasonable police officer at the scene.” See Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), discussed in Part III, A (reporting that [t]he International
Association of Chiefs of Police has described use of force as the “amount of effort required
by police to compel compliance by an unwilling subject”).
51. See Bill Hutchinson, Atlanta Police Use-of-Force Policy Violated Multiple Times in
Fatal Shooting of Rayshard Brooks: Prosecutor, ABC NEWS (June 18, 2020, 4:21 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/atlanta-police-force-policy-violated-multiple-times-fatal/story?
id=71295429/. Following the George Floyd and Rayshard Brooks killings, some
municipalities are reassessing their use of force policies. See, e.g., Atlanta Mayor Orders
Changes to Police Use-of-Force Policy, Calls Rayshard Brooks Shooting “Murder”, CBS
NEWS (June 16, 2020, 8:38 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/atlanta-mayor-keishabottoms-police-force-policy-rayshard-brooks-shooting/.
52. See Ivana Dukanovic, Note, Reforming High-Stakes Police Departments: How
Federal Civil Rights Will Rebuild Constitutional Policing in America, 43 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 911, 913 (2016).
53. See Jordan B. Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117
MICH. L. REV. 635 (2019) (analyzing a comprehensive data set of thousands of traffic stops
that resulted in violence against officers across more than two hundred law enforcement
agencies in Florida over a 10-year period and finding that “violence against officers was rare
and that incidents that do involve violence are typically low risk and do not involve
weapons”).
54. See FBI Releases 2019 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of
Duty, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 4, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/
pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2019-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-in-th
e-line-of-duty.
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acts, forty-four of whom were killed by firearms.55 Despite the low risk of
being killed by civilians, police officers are still licensed to kill, pursuant to
and restricted by official police policies.56
Further, many other controversial, yet legal, tactics are used to perform
the policing function, often resulting in police brutality. Many of those are
abusively used against Blacks, including use of “nonlethal” weapons,57 noknock warrants,58 racial profiling,59 bench warrants following default
judgments,60 and stop and frisk.61

55. See, FBI Releases 2019 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of
Duty, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 4, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/
pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2019-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-in-th
e-line-of-duty.
56. See supra note 46.
57. Police officers are legally permitted to use “nonlethal” (but often deadly) weapons,
including rubber bullets, tear gas, flash-bangs, beanbag rounds, Tasers, and attack dogs, as
evidenced by their use during the recent Black Lives protests, sometimes causing serious, even
fatal, injuries. Pepper spray is an example of nonlethal force, which along with other forms of
non-lethal force can cause serious bodily harm. See Amy McKeever, From Tear Gas to Rubber
Bullets, Here’s What ‘Nonlethal’ Weapons Can Do to the Body, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June
2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/06/what-nonle thal-weapons-can-doto-the-body-george-floyd/; see Sgt. Tracee L. Jackson Non-Lethal Packs a Punch, JOINT
INTERMEDIATE FORCE CAPABILITIES OFFICE (Aug. 12, 2006), https:// jnlwp.defense.gov/PressRoom/In-The-News/Article/577845/non-lethal-packs-a-punch/ (stating “a weapon is considered
non-lethal because it does not produce penetrating trauma. If it doesn’t go into an individual’s
skin, it’s called non-lethal. However, many weapons used may produce lethal results if
employed in a different manner. The terminology better suited to this array of gadgets is ‘less
than lethal’”). For a detailed recounting of all “less-lethal” weapons that law enforcement is
allowed to use, see Alyssa Fowers et al., A Guide to the Less-Lethal Weapons That Law
Enforcement Uses Against Protestors, WASH. POST (June 5, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/05/less-lethal-weapons-protests/?arc404=true.
58. A judge may issue a no-knock warrant that allows police officers to enter a property
without immediate prior notification of the residents, such as by knocking or ringing a
doorbell. See generally Peter G. Berris et al., “No Knock” Warrants and Other Law
Enforcement Identification Considerations, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2020), https://crsre
ports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10499.
59. Police use “racial profiling” when suspecting or targeting a person on the basis of
assumed characteristics or behavior of a racial group, rather than on individual suspicion. See
Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence, 51
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 167–73 (2016) (identifying racial profiling as a factor in police
shootings).
60. A judge may issue a bench warrant, which authorizes police to arrest a person
charged with some contempt, crime, or misdemeanor. See, e.g., Richard A. Webster, One in
7 Adults in New Orleans Have a Warrant Out for Their Arrest, New Data Shows, WASH. POST
(Sept. 20, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/one-in-7-adults-innew-orleans-have-a-warrant-out-for-their-arrest-new-data-shows/2019/09/20/db85a5c8-da3
d-11e9-a688-303693fb4b0b_story.html.
61. Police are allowed to stop and frisk, a controversial practice, allowing police to
temporarily detain, question, search people for drugs, weapons, and contraband. See L. Song
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The use of deadly force and other “nonlethal” tactics has become more
pervasive, as the criminalization of petty crimes has increased law
enforcement’s intrusion into our everyday lives,62 leading to over-policing63
and the militarization of the police.64 This is especially true in relation to the
War on Drugs (the “WOD”),65 which has increased searches66 and arrests,67
with a disproportionate impact on the Black community.68 As a result of the
Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1144–46 (2012)
(identifying a reasonableness problem in the low hit rates of stop-and-frisks and the judgment
of suspiciousness).
62. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1062 (2015).
63. Jonathan Blanks, The War on Drugs Has Made Policing More Violent: What Can be
Done to Curb the Excessive and, Sometimes, Predatory Policing that Has Emerged from the
Drug War?, DEMOCRACY: J. OF IDEAS (July 19, 2016), https://democracyjournal.
org/arguments/the-war-on-drugs-has-made-policing-more-violent/ (last visited July 22,
2019) (noting that “[p]olice are incentivized to initiate unnecessary contact with pedestrians
and motorists, and they do so most often against ethnic and racial minorities. Such overpolicing engenders resentment among minority communities and jeopardizes public safety”).
64. See, e.g., RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013) (arguing that militarization has produced police forces
inconsistent with the principles of a free society); see also WHO DO YOU SERVE, WHO DO
YOU PROTECT? POLICE VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (Maya Schenwar et
al. eds. 2016) (exploring alternatives to the police for keeping communities safe); Mary D.
Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence, 90 IND.
L.J. 151 (2015).
65. “War on Drugs,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the politically-motivated legal
and extra-legal campaign to discourage the production, distribution, and consumption
of psychoactive drugs, particularly marijuana. See generally Scott C. Martin, A Brief History
of Marijuana Law in the United States, TIME (Apr. 20, 2016), http://time.com/4298038/
marijuana-history-in-america/; Mitchell F. Crusto, Weeding Out Injustice: Amnesty for Pot
Offenders, 47 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 367 (2020).
66. While the Fourth Amendment states “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, paper and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” there is little
doubt that WOD policy has whittled away significantly at that protection. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. See, e.g., Radley Balko, The Drug War Exception for the Fourth Amendment,
WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2014 1:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/
wp/2014/03/31/the-drug-war-exception-to-the-fourth-amendment/; Conor Friedersdorf,
Thurgood Marshall’s Prescient Warning: Don’t Gut the 4th Amendment, THE ATLANTIC (July
10, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/thurgood-marshalls-presci
ent-warning-dont-gut-the-4th-amendment/277657/.
67. For example, about twenty percent, or about four hundred thousand of those
incarcerated, are imprisoned for marijuana-related offenses. See Drug War Statistics, DRUG
POLICY ALLIANCE https://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/drug-war-statistics (last visited Aug.
31, 2020) (noting that the U.S. spends over fifty billion dollars on the war on drugs, annually,
with over six hundred thousand arrested in 2016 for marijuana law violations, of which eightynine percent were only for possession).
68. April M. Short, Michelle Alexander: White Men Get Rich from Legal Pot, Black Men
Stay in Prison, ALTERNET (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/drugs/michellealexander-white-men-get-rich-legal-pot-black-men-stay-prison (calling for reparations for
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WOD, every person in America is a suspect, and Blacks, in particular, are
presumed guilty until proven innocent.69
In summary, the highly publicized, questionable police killings and the
subsequent exoneration of the offending officers has heightened a centuriesold-call for an end to police brutality against Blacks.70 That rallying call will
be forever remembered, although one wonders whether it will produce real
change.
B. The Movement
The Black Lives Matter Movement is an international movement
against systemic racism and police brutality. It started in protest to the
February 26, 2012, killing of Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old Black
male, by George Zimmerman, a white male and self-appointed
“neighborhood watch coordinator.”71 Martin’s death prompted rallies,
marches, and protests across the nation,72 including an online petition calling
for a full investigation and prosecution of Zimmerman that received 2.2

the war on drugs, as the WOD has decimated families, spread despair and hopelessness
through entire communities).
69. See Drug War Statistics, supra note 66 (“In the 39 states for which we have sufficient
police data, Black adults were more than four times as likely to be arrested for marijuana
possession as white adults.” (footnotes omitted.)). See also Report: The War on Marijuana
in Black and White, AM. C.L. UNION, (June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf (last visited July 22, 2019);
Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on
Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 391 (2002).
70. See e.g., Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long, Painful History of Police Brutality in the
U.S., THE SMITHSONIAN (July 27, 2017) https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonianinstitution/long-painful-history-police-brutality-in-the-us-180964098/ (updated May 29,
2020); H. Bruce Pierce, Blacks and Law Enforcement: Towards Police Brutality Reduction,
17 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 3 (1986); Police Violence Against Afro-Descendants in the United
States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. No. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. doc. 156 (2018), http://www.oas.
org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/PoliceUseOfForceAfrosUSA.pdf.
71. Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23, 2012,
10:48
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/in
dex.html (Martin was returning home to a condominium owned by his father’s fiancé, after
buying a can of Arizona Iced Tea and a pack of Skittles, in Sanford, Florida. Zimmerman
saw the teenager and reported him to the Sanford Police as “suspicious” and several minutes
later, fatally shot the Black teenager in the chest.).
72. Karen Grigsby Bates, A Look Back at Trayvon Martin’s Death and the Movement It
Inspired, NPR (July 31, 2018, 7:34 AM) https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2018/07/
31/631897758/a-look-back-at-trayvon-martins-death-and-the-movement-it-inspired;
Matt
Williams et al., Trayvon Martin Protests Being Held in More than 100 US Cities, THE
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2013, 10:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/20/tray
von-martin-protests-us-cities.
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million signatures.73 After national media focused on the incident,
Zimmerman was eventually charged and tried, but a jury acquitted him of
second-degree murder and manslaughter in July 2013.74 In response to the
acquittal of George Zimmerman, the Movement began with the use of the
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter on social media.75
Then, the Movement received national attention following the police
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.76 On August 9, 2014,
Michael Brown, Jr., an eighteen-year-old Black male, was fatally shot by a
white male Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson.77 This incident ignited
one of the first in-person public protests of the Movement, at a St. Louis
mall, utilizing the slogan “Hands up, don’t shoot.”78
Over five years later, the death of George Floyd by a police chokehold
reignited the Movement, bringing broad national79 and international
attention80 to racial inequity in this country.81 Throughout its history, the
Movement demanded police reform, particularly, as it relates to brutality
73. Tracy Martin & Sybrina Fulton, Prosecute the Killer of Our Son, 17-Year-Old
Trayvon Martin (Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.change.org/p/prosecute-the-killer-of-our-son17-year-old-trayvon-martin.
74. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimm ermanverdict-trayvon-martin.html.
75. See Garza, supra note 15.
76. Larry Buchanan et al., Q&A What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-undersiege-after-police-shooting.html?_r=0.
77. Eliot C. McLaughlin, What We Know About Michael Brown’s Shooting, CNN (Aug.
15, 2014, 12:10 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-ferguson-michaelbrown-what-we-know/index.html.
78. Nicholas Cannariato, ‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’ Examines What Led To Ferguson and
Baltimore Protests, NPR (Aug. 1 2019, 1:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/01/7454
84653/hands-up-don-t-shoot. Despite the protest, on November 24, 2014, the local prosecutor
announced the St. Louis County grand jury decided not to indict Officer Wilson, which
resulted in more protests, injuries, and property damage. In March 2015, the U.S. Department
of Justice concluded that Wilson shot Brown in self-defense, while also finding systemic
discrimination against Blacks by the Ferguson Police Department and municipal court.
79. See We Demand National Change to Protect Citizens and Communities from Police
Violence and Misconduct, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/u-s-senate-we-demandnational-change-to-protect-citizens-and-communities-from-police-violence-and-misconduct
(last visited Apr. 28, 2019) (online petition).
80. See Arian Campo-Flores & Joshua Jamerson, Black Lives Matter’s Years of Pressure
Paved Way for Sudden Police Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2020), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/black-lives-matters-years-of-pressure-paved-way-for-sudden-police-overha
ul-11592516422; Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Why Is Police Brutality Still Happening?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/opinion/minneapolis-policebrutality.html.
81. See, e.g., U.S. Must Take ‘Serious Action’ to Half Police Killings of Unarmed African
Americans, U.N. NEWS (May 28, 2020) https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/ 1065042.
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against Blacks.82 In distinguishing Black victims of such brutality, the
Movement highlights how Blacks are the victims of State-sponsored
violence:
Black Lives Matter is a unique contribution that goes beyond
extrajudicial killings of Black people by police and vigilantes . . .
When we say Black Lives Matter, we are talking about the ways in
which Black people are deprived of our basic human rights and
dignity. It is an acknowledgement [that] Black poverty and
genocide is state violence . . . And the fact is that the lives of Black
people—not ALL people—exist within these conditions is [a]
consequence of state violence.83
Hence, the Movement is about social injustice, equal protection under
the law, and, most importantly, the need to redress State-sponsored racial
oppression of Blacks.84 Consequently, Black Lives Matter is one of the most
significant social movements in recent history.85
Analytically, to date, the Movement has produced some positive results
in achieving two major objectives, (1) bringing attention to police brutality
against Blacks and (2) seeking change in systemic racism.86 Most
importantly, it has awakened a moral conscience to redress systemic

82.
83.
84.

Id.
See Garza, supra note 15.
See Rana Foroohar, Black Lives Matter Is About Both Race and Class, FINANCIAL
TIMES (June 14, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/28dc48f8-b36b-4848-8e73-774999a
8e502 (discussing the intersections of racism and capitalism as they pertain exploitation of
labor, specifically Black labor); Jon Schwarz, Black Lives Matter Wants to End Police
Brutality. History Suggests It Will Go Much Further, THE INTERCEPT (June 27, 2020, 5:00
AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/27/black-lives-matter-police-brutality-history/ (discussing
the broad concept of redirection of public money from policing to health care, housing,
schools and jobs that the Movement has put to the table thus far).
85. See Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be The Largest Movement in U.S.
History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/
us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html (noting that, based on recent polling, about fifteen
million to twenty-six million people in the United States have participated in demonstrations
over the death of George Floyd and others in recent weeks). For a visual representation of
the movement worldwide, see Black Lives Matter Protests 2020, https://www.creosote
maps.com/blm2020/ (last updated Sept. 3, 2020).
86. See infra Part III, B.
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racism,87 including a renewed call for reparations.88 Overall, the Movement
has brought attention to important conversations and fostered a spirit of equal
justice for every American, particularly relating to police accountability.89
Unfortunately, the Movement has yet to achieve a real change in
policing.90 Many of the proposed reforms have transformative potential, such
as the re-imagining of policing;91 however, some of the changes have
87. See James Lartey, Oppression America: ‘To Root This Out We Need a Movement
Against Racist Policies, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2018 6:00 PM), https://www.theguard
ian.com/us-news/2018/jun/06/everyday-racism-in-america-how-to-fix-it; Justin Worland,
America’s Long Overdue Awakening to Systemic Racism, TIME (June 11, 2020, 6:41 AM),
https://time.com/5851855/systemic-racism-america/; Washington Post Staff, Resources to
Understand America’s Long History of Injustice and Inequality, WASH. POST (June 26, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/08/understanding-racism-inequality-amer
ica/?arc404=true.
88. The discussion around the case for reparations owes a great service to Ta-Neishi
Coates’ thorough and thoughtful piece in The Atlantic from 2014, without which the case for
reparations would be unlikely to have gained the momentum and traction that it now has. See
Ta-Neishi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/; see also, Nikole
Hannah-Jones, What is Owed, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (June 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/06/24/magazine/reparations-slavery.html; Patricia Cohen, What Reparations
for Slavery Might Look Like in 2019, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/23/business/economy/reparations-slavery.html; Thai Jones, Slavery Reparations
Seem Impossible. In Many Places They’re Already Happening, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/31/slavery-reparations-seem-impossiblemany-places-theyre-already-happening/?arc404=true; Seth Cohen, An Overdue Debt-Why
It’s Finally Time to Pay Reparations to Black Americans, FORBES (June 21, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sethcohen/2020/06/21/its-finally-time-to-pay-black-america
ns-reparations/#472a85b65cb5; Emma Goldberg, How Reparations for Slavery Became a
2020 Campaign Issue, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/us/
politics/reparations-slavery.html (updated June 24, 2020).
89. See generally Monu Bedi, The Asymmetry of Crimes by and Against Police Officers,
66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 79 (2017) (recommending that “[s]tates should care equally about harms
by and against police officers and their impact on state activity”).
90. See generally President’s Trump’s Executive Order on Safe Policing (June 16,
2020); https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-safe-policing-safecommunities/. There has also been stalled legislation. See Catie Edmonson, Democrats
Unveil Sweeping Bill Targeting Police Misconduct and Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/us/politics/democrats-police-misconduct-bill-protes
ts.html (June 23, 2020); Sara Ferris et al., House Passes Seeping Police Reform Bill, POLITCO,
(June 25, 2020, 8:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/25/police-reform-planhouse-339691; E. Greve, Democrats Block ‘Empty’ Republican Police Reform Bill, THE
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/24/congresspolice-reform-republican-bill-democrats; Niv Elis, House Democrats Include $597 Million
for Police Reform in Spending Bill, THE HILL (July 7, 2020 10:11 AM), https://thehill.com/
policy/finance/506152-house-democrats-propose-597-million-toward-police-reform.
91. See, e.g., Tom Jackman, African American Mayors Lay Out Plan for Police Reform
Without ‘Defunding’, WASH. POST (July 27, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/crime-law/2020/07/27/african-american-mayors-lay-out-plan-police-reform-witho
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remained symbolic, such as the taking down of controversial monuments,
particularly those dedicated to Confederate generals.92
The movement has not ended police killings of Blacks nor has it
produced convictions of police officers who use deadly force.93 That is
because, when it comes to stopping police officers from killing Blacks, the
Movement faces formidable legal and policy obstacles, which will be
discussed in section C and are referred to as a conundrum.
C. Conundrum
When it comes to the issue of police use of lethal force against Blacks,
the Movement faces a conundrum—that the legal system and policing
culture unintentionally condone the killings of Blacks by white police
officers.94 This contention is supported by statistical evidence and a case
study of an eleven year investigation and prosecution of a mass shooting of
Black people by a band of white police officers, in the Katrina Massacre.95
The next section has two parts: (1) it introduces the concepts of the Blue
Shield and the Blue Code and argues that those combine to protect police
officers from criminal liability when they use deadly force, and (2) it presents

ut-defunding/; Kristina Sgueglia et al., New York Police Department’s Budget Has Been
Slashed by $1 Billion, CNN (July 1, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/01/us/
new-york-budget-nypd-1-billion-cut-trnd/index.html; Vannessa Romo, Minneapolis Council
Moves to Defund Police, Establish ‘Holistic’ Public Safety Force, NPR (June 26, 2020, 8:14
P.M.), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/06/26/8841
49659/minneapolis-council-moves-to-defund-police-establish-holistic-public-safety-forc;
David Zahsner et al., Los Angeles Cut LAPD Spending, Taking Police Staffing to its Lowest
Level in 12 Years, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/202007-01/lapd-budget-cuts-protesters-police-brutality.
92. See Robert Draper, Toppling Statues Is a First Step Toward Ending Confederate
Myths, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 2, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/
2020/07/toppling-statues-is-first-step-toward-ending-confederate-myths/; Alisha Ebrahimji
et al., Confederate Statutes Are Coming Down Following George Floyd’s Death. Here’s
What to Know, CNN (July 1, 2020 3:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/09/us/confedera
te-statues-removed-george-floyd-trnd/index.html; Colleen Walsh, Must We Allow Symbols of
Racism on Public Land, THE HARVARD GAZETTE (June 19, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/
gazette/story/2020/06/historian-puts-the-push-to-remove-confederate-statues-in-context//.
93. See infra, Part I, A.
94. This Article refers to this problem as the “Black Lives Matter Conundrum.” See,
e.g., Jamiles Lartey, Why It’s Not So Simple to Arrest The Cops Who Shot Breonna Taylor:
Memes and Billboards Are Calling for Arresting the Three Officers. But What Does Kentucky
Law Say?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproj
ect.org/2020/08/08/why-it-s-not-so-simple-to-arrest-the-cops-who-shot-breonna-taylor. See
generally FINAL REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1
(2015), http://elearning-courses.net/iacp/html/webinarResources/170926/FinalReport21stC
enturyPolicing.pdf.
95. See infra Part I, C, 2.
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the lessons from the Katrina Massacre, which shows how those concepts
work in tandem to frustrate police accountability.
1. Hyper-Protection
In order for the Movement, and society,96 to succeed in saving Black
lives, one must understand the systemic ways in which the law protects white
police officers who kill Blacks. This preferential treatment is referred to as
unequal justice.97
There are unequal, hyper-protective rights and privileges that protect
officers from criminal liability. The first is the “Blue Shield”98— the legal
rules and doctrines that promote and condone the police use of lethal force.99
The second is the “Blue Code”100—a system and culture that protects police
officers from personal and criminal liability and supports systemic racism.101
In addition to these extralegal protections, relative to criminal liability,
every police officer enjoys all the constitutional and State-based legal
protections that each person enjoys. Those include the right to due
process,102 the presumption of innocence,103 the State’s burden to prove the

96. Sadly, to date, the legal system, including policymakers, academics, bar associations,
legislators, police associations, and the like, have not taken responsibility for reforming a legal
system that promotes and condones police killings of Blacks.
97. “Unequal justice,” for the purpose of this Article, refers to the preferential body of
rules to judge the criminal liability of police officers for killing people, which differs,
unequally, from the rules used to judge other members of the public.
98. “Blue Shield,” for purposes of this Article, is defined as a combination of Supreme
Court judicial doctrines that serve to shield police officers from personal, criminal liability,
for harm done during the course of policing. See also Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After
Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 1, 4 (2015) (“[I]ndividual instances of police deadly force against unarmed Black men
are enabled by a legal jurisprudence of structural violence which provides no accountability
for the societal marginalization and stigmatization of young Black men”).
99. See infra Part III, A.
100. “Blue Code,” for purposes of this Article, is defines as a system of police culture,
local practices, and racism that serves as an additional layer of protection, by which police
offices avoid criminal liability. See infra Part III, B.
101. See infra Part III, B.
102. See infra Part III, B.
103. In criminal prosecutions, a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. See
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1895) (establishing the presumption of innocence
of persons accused of crimes). This means the State has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the alleged committed the crime.
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elements of the charge of criminality,104 the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard,105 mens rea,106 and other legal defenses.107
Those normal protections, combined with the hyper-protections of the
Blue Shield and the Blue Code, make it nearly impossible to prosecute and
convict a white male police officer for killing a Black person.108 Statistics
report that while police officers fatally shot over one thousand people each
year over a ten-year period, only fifty-four officers were charged with a
crime during that same period.109 In the exceptional instance where an

104. To convict, the State must have the evidence necessary to convince a jury that the
accused is guilty of the charges, beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of George Floyd, the
evidence of the killing seems clear: the police officer kneeled on the victim’s neck. Yet, there
is a dispute over whether that heinous act was the actual cause of Mr. Floyd’s death. There
are competing coroner reports on the cause of death and how Mr. Floyd’s existing medical
condition may have contributed to his death. See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Independent
Autopsy of George Floyd Contradicts Official Report, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2020), https://
www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-06-01/george-floyd-independent-autopsy-asphyxia.
105. The State has the duty to prove its case of criminality beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 460. This requires the prosecutor to establish sufficient proof or
evidence to charge a police officer. Id. This varies from State to State, with each crime
requiring differing requirements of proof. For example, as it is very difficult to prove firstdegree murder charges, police officers, such as those in the George Floyd case are seldom, if
ever, charged with first-degree murder. See Ian Millhiser, The Charges Against Former
Minnesota Police Officer Derek Chauvin, Explained, VOX (June 1, 2020, 2:30 PM), https://
www.vox.com/2020/6/1/21276936/derek-chauvin-charges-third-degree-murder-explainedgeorge-floyd.
106. To convict, the State must prove the required mens rea, that is, that the accused had
the intent or knowledge of the wrong for which he or she is charged. See generally PAUL H.
ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES (4th ed. 2017).
Sometimes, intent can be negated by certain defenses such as the plea of insanity. See Stephen
J. Morse et al., The Uneasy Entente Between Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona
97 NORTHWESTERN J. CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 1071 (2007).
107. There are many other legal defenses to homicide charges. For example, self-defense
statutes provide an affirmative defense to the justifiable use of deadly force.107 See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (providing that a person is free to use lethal force if that person
reasonably believes that using such force is necessary to prevent imminent danger or great
bodily harm to that person or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible
felony). See Morse, supra 105.
108. However, these hyper-protections failed to protect a Black police officer from
prosecution and conviction, for killing a white woman, while policing. One example is the
case of Mohamed Noor, who is a Black, Somali-American, Muslim police officer who fatally
shot Justine Ruszczyk (Damond), a white, Australian woman, in Minnesota on July 15, 2017.
And then was convicted for the homicide and sentence to twelve and a half years in prison.
See John Eligon, A Black Officer, a White Woman, A Rare Murder Conviction. Is It
‘Hypocrisy,’ or Justice?, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/
us/mohamed-noor-guilty.html (reporting also that the victim’s family received an
unprecedented $20 million settlement).
109. See Kimberly Kindy et al., Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-fe w-
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officer was charged in a deadly shooting, there were “high profile” factors
such as a victim shot in the back, a video recording of the incident,
incriminating testimony from other officers, or allegations of a cover-up.110
Further, the few police officers who were convicted or pled guilty to a fatal
shooting received an average of four years of jail time, and sometimes only
weeks.111
In addition to the convincing statistical evidence, section two presents
conclusive evidence that it is nearly impossible to convict a white police
officer for killing a Black person. This is the finding of a case study of the
Katrina Massacre, where several white policemen were not convicted for
fatally shooting two Blacks and maiming others,112even though the officers
admitted the Blacks they shot were innocent victims, and that the crimes
were committed without justification, willfully, and then covered up.113
2. The Katrina Massacre
In New Orleans, on August 30, 2005, Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge
decimated the city’s flood level protection system,114 creating a humanitarian
crisis.115 On Sunday, September 4, 2005, two Black families were struggling

prosecuted/; Matt Ferner et al., Here’s How Many Cops Got Convicted of Murder Last Year
for On-Duty Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions_us_5695968ce4b086bc1cd5d0da.
Parenthetically, many of these cases result in expensive settlements of wrongful death claims.
See, e.g., Nick Wing, We Pay a Shocking Amount for Police Misconduct, and Cops Want Us
to Accept It. We Shouldn’t, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2015, 7:39 AM), http://m.
huffpost.com/us/entry/7423386. See, e.g., Eric Levenson, What Georgia Law Says About
When Police Can Use Deadly Force, CNN (June 15, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www.
cnn.com/2020/06/15/us/rayshard-brooks-force-law/index.html (“From 2015 to 2020, police
in Georgia have shot and killed 182 people, according to The Washington Post’s Fatal Force
tracker. In that time, only one Georgia officer has been charged with murder.”).
110. Id. See also infra Part I, C.
111. See Kindy, supra note 108.
112John Burnett, What Happened on New Orleans’ Danziger Bridge?, NPR (Sept. 13, 2016
1:28 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6063982.
113. See id.
114. See generally LeevesOrg, The Katrina Myth; the Truth About a Thoroughly
Unnatural Disaster, YOUTUBE (Aug. 30, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
wln_iq5bc8k&t=6s.
115. See generally HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA’S UNNATURAL DISASTER 186 (Jeremy
I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker eds. 2009); UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE NATION ON
HURRICANE KATRINA (Betsy Reed ed. 2006) (viewing Katrina as “a social catastrophe directly
caused by the government’s callous indifference to the needs of the region’s most vulnerable
residents”).
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to survive the floodwaters and chaotic conditions.116 On the same day,
several white male New Orleans Police Department officers, in an unmarked
rental truck, sped west down U.S. Highway 90, toward the Danziger
Bridge.117 As the police officers approached, one of the families, the
Bartholomews, started running up the bridge, in fear that criminals were
shooting at them.118
One officer then took out an assault rifle and open fired on all six
fleeing, unarmed Blacks.119 More police officers continued driving toward
the supposed suspects, while firing at them.120 The police officers’ bullets
struck nearly every member of the Black family, leaving only one physically
unharmed.121 Stunned, one of the victims, nineteen-year-old Jose Holmes,
stopped to examine the wounds on his stomach.122 When the police officers
reached him, they shot him two more times.123
Meanwhile, on the west end of the bridge, other white male police
officers saw two men running in a direction away from the police.124 At that
point, one officer leaned out of the window of the moving car and fired a
shotgun into the back of a Black male who was mentally-challenged, fatally
wounding him.125 Another officer then got out of the police car and began
to kick his dying body.126
Sadly, two of the victims died on the Danziger Bridge that day.127 In
addition, four other Black victims were maimed by police gunfire,128
including a mother whose right arm was nearly shot off and had to be
amputated.129 When the media first reported the Danziger Bridge shootings,

116. See RONNIE GREENE, SHOTS ON THE BRIDGE: POLICE VIOLENCE AND COVER-UP IN THE
WAKE OF KATRINA 20, 31–34 (2015).
117. Joe Rawley, Officer Who Initiated Danziger Call Testifies, WGNO (June 29, 2011,
6:08 PM), http://wgno.com/2011/06/29/officer-who-initiated-danziger-call-testifies/.
118. See Burnett, supra note 111; LeevesOrg, supra note 113. As noted, the police
officers were in an unmarked rental van, with no distinguishing identification that they were
police officers.
119. See id.
120. Laura Maggi et al., Judge in Danziger Case Sickened by “Raw Brutality of the
Shooting and the Craven Lawlessness of the Cover-Up”, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 8, 2010),
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/04/judgesickenedbyrawbrutalit.html.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Burnett, supra note 111; LeevesOrg, supra note 113.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Burnett, supra note 111; LeevesOrg, supra note 113.
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they celebrated the police officers as heroes who diligently protected the city
from criminals.130
Over the next eleven years, the federal government conducted an
investigation and prosecuted the police officers for civil rights’ violations,
after controversial local investigations and two failed prosecutions at the
state level.131 During a federal trial, the police officers who fatally shot and
maimed the Black families admitted that they had acted without justification
and covered up their wrongdoings, including planting a gun and arresting an
innocent victim.132 Despite this overwhelming evidence, the federal
conviction was ultimately thrown out; yet, the officers served some prison
time for lesser offenses, following the negotiation of a plea bargain.133
The Katrina Massacre teaches the following valuable lessons: (1) police
internal investigations of the use of lethal force incidents are unreliable and
likely biased to protect fellow officers;134 (2) justice must be demanded and
family members are the key to a successful prosecution;135 (3) local
prosecutors and local judges are pro-police, showing unconscious racial
bias;136 (4) an independent, federal investigation is needed to conduct a

130. Christine Lagorio, Indicted N.O. Cops Greeted as “Heroes”, CBSNEWS (Jan. 3,
2007, 5:55 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/indicted-no-cops-greeted-as-heroes/.
131. See United States v. Bowen, No. 10-20, 2010 WL 2771476 (E.D. La. July 12, 2010).
132. Laura Maggi, Police Supervisor Encouraged Cover-Up, Knew Officer Planted Gun
While Still on Danziger Bridge, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb. 24, 2010), https://www.nola.com/
crime/index.ssf/2010/02/police_investigator_encouraged.html; Justin Elliott, New Orleans
Cop Explains How Police Gunned Down Unarmed Civilians in Post-Katrina Incident,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 8, 2010, 5:47 AM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.
com/2010/04/new_orleans_cop_explains_how_police_gunned_down_ci.php.
133. After being found guilty, the Court threw out the conviction on a technicality. The
U.S. Attorney decided not to retry the case and to settle for a plea bargain. See U.S. Attorney
Kenneth A. Polite Delivers Remarks Following the Guilty Pleas and Sentencings of Five
Former New Orleans Police Officers in the Danziger Bridge Shooting, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr.
20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edla/pr/us-attorney-kenneth-polite-delivers-remar
ks-following-guilty-pleas-and-sentencings-five.
134. Brendan McCarthy, Danziger Bridge Case Suggests Culture of Corruption at
NOPD, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/
2010/03/danziger_bridge_details.html; Sarah Moughty, Former NOPD Officers Testify About
“Secret Meeting” to Determine Danziger Bridge Cover-Up, PBS FRONTLINE (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/law-disorder/former-nopd-offic
ers-testify-about-secret-meeting-to-determine-danziger-bridge-cover-up/.
135. See Paul Harris, Relatives Demand Justice as Police go on Trial over Katrina
Killings, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2007, 9:23 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2007/mar/04/hurricanekatrina.usa.
136. See Charges Dismissed Against Police in Post-Katrina Shootings, CNN (Aug. 13,
2008, 6:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/08/13/danziger.seven/; see also United
States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 n.3 (E.D. La. 2013) (“The primary basis for the
dismissal of the indictment was the order of defendant Kenneth Bowen to give testimony,
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proper gathering of the evidence and facts;137 (5) police officers lie, destroy
evidence, and cover-up the facts;138 (6) charges of conspiracy to obstruct
justice and misprision of a felony are effective means to discover the truth;139
and (7) federal indictments and trials will not result in a homicide
conviction,140 despite a finding of willful actions and admissions by the
police and the imprisonment of an innocent person who the police
wrongfully arrested and accused of shooting at them.141

over his assertion of his Constitutional rights, before the state grand jury on October 30, 2006,
in exchange for immunity under La.C.Cr.P. Art. 439.1(C).”).
137. Feds Take Up Investigation of Cops in Post-Katrina Bridge Shooting Case, FOX
NEWS (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.foxnews.com/story/feds-take-up-investigation-of-copsin-post-katrina-bridge-shooting-case; Brendan McCarthy, FBI Seizes Police Files in
Danziger Bridge Shootings, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 7, 2009, 8:44 PM), http://www.nola.com/
crime/index.ssf/2009/08/fbi_seizes_police_files_in_bri.html.
138. See United States v. Lehrmann, No. 10-51, 2011 WL 4344582, at *1–*3 (E.D. La.
Sept. 15, 2011); United States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 612 (E.D. La. 2013). See also
Ex-Police Officer Admits Role in Cover-Up of Louisiana Bridge Shooting, CNN (Mar. 11,
2010, 1:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/03/11/nopd.shooting/index.html; Former
Detective Describes Cover-Up, “Ham Sandwich”, PBS FRONTLINE (July 12, 2011), http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/law-disorder/blog/2011/07/former-detective-describes-c
over-up-ham-sandwich.html.
139. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fifth New Orleans Police Officer Pleads
Guilty in Danziger Bridge Case (June 4, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/neworleans/
press-releases/2010/no060410.htm.
140. Subsequently, the rogue police officers were not prosecuted and did not serve time
for the homicides, instead, they were permitted to plea bargain for lesser crimes and with
reduced sentences. On April 20, 2016, the U.S. Attorney announced that, under the terms of
the deal, the police officers’ sentences would be dramatically reduced, with the four police
officers who actually shot the civilians to serve sentences ranging from seven to twelve years
in prison—a great reduction from the original sentences that were handed down in 2012 which
had ranged from thirty-eight to sixty-five years imprisonment. See U.S. Attorney Kenneth A.
Polite Delivers Remarks Following the Guilty Pleas and Sentencings of Five Former New
Orleans Police Officers in the Danziger Bridge Shooting, supra note 132; Ashley Fantz et al.,
Former New Orleans Officers Plead Guilty in Danziger Bridge Shootings, CNN (Apr. 21,
2016, 8:25 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/20/us/new-orleans-danziger-bridge-pleadeal/index.html.
141. On August 5, 2011, nearly six years after the shootings and three days of deliberation,
the jury found each of the accused police officers guilty of all twenty-five counts, inclusive
of depriving of civil rights, using firearms to shoot innocent people, conspiracy to obstruct
justice, falsifying prosecution, planting a firearm, and making false statements to the FBI.
United States v. Bowen, 799 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2015). However, on September 17, 2013,
U.S. District Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt, in a 129-page ruling, threw out the convictions and
granted a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Order and Reasons, Bowen, 969 F.
Supp. 2d at 612 (E.D. La. 2013). That ruling was later affirmed by an en banc decision of the
U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On February 23, 2016, the district court reported that the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court decision to vacate the convictions and to order a new
trial. United States v. Bowen, 813 F.3d 600, 601 (5th Cir. 2016) (reporting a straw poll of the
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In summary, the Katrina Massacre supports the proposition that the
Blue Code and the Blue Shield make it nearly impossible to successfully
prosecute a rogue police officer for the use of lethal force, even when they
willfully kill people. Further, the case study demonstrates that there needs
to be a transformative change in the law. Such a solution must address the
policies and practices of the use of deadly force, must be constitutionally
mandated, and must dismantle the Blue Shield and the Blue Code. That
solution is presented next, in the form of a model code.142

II. George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code
The “George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code” (the “GFAC”) is the
proposed solution to the Black Lives Matter Conundrum. It reflects the
normative claim that every person in this country has the constitutional right
to be protected from police executions—without a conviction of a capital
offense, without due process, and in an inhumane manner.143 Additionally,
the Code provides for the absolute abolition of the police use of lethal force.
The Code serves as a model for government officials and policymakers
to achieve just police reform.144 The specific provisions of the GFAC follow
the main text of this Article as Addendum I. The three tenets reflected in the
provisions of the GFAC are as follows.
Tenet #1: The GFAC recognizes that there is a symbiotic relationship
between the police and the community and that any solution to the Black
Lives Matter Conundrum must comply with Dean Derrick Bell’s “interestconvergence” principle.145

appellate court judges where seven judges voted for and seven judges voted against granting
the portion for a new trial, with one abstention).
142. The use of a code instead of a statute is due to the recognition that a constitutionally
mandated remedy reflects the victim’s right to protection against wrongful governmental
infringement. It applies broadly and to all levels and branches of government.
143. This rights-based approach to the application of capital punishment jurisprudence to
lethal force killings is consistent with former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s vision of federalism, as a means to protect individuals from undue governmental
intrusion. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (dissenting in a medical marijuana
decision, stating “This case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. The States’ core
police powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens”). See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, The Deregulatory
Valence of Justice O’Connor’s Federalism, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 507 (2008).
144. As the Fourteenth Amendment expressly grants Congress the authority to guarantee
the effectiveness of the Amendment, Congress is authorized to enact the GFAC. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
145. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education “and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma”, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The interests of [B]lacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites”).
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Tenet #2: The GFAC seeks to identify a constitutionally based solution
to the Conundrum, one that supports the fundamental rights of the victim;
rather than one based on a privilege granted by the white power structure.
Tenet #3: The GFAC’s primary goal is the end of police killings, by
eliminating the policies, practices, and training that permit police officers to
use lethal force, and by placing a special burden on the Federal Government
to protect the constitutional rights of those victims and would-be victims.146
In conclusion, the GFAC’s prohibition of the police use of lethal force
constitutes a win-win, as it protects life and frees police officers from the
duty to use lethal force. This change will deliver both justice and peace. Part
III will argue why the GFAC is both constitutionally mandated and
dismantles a feature of systemic racism.147

III.

Equal Justice

Part III presents the constitutional and policy basis for the proposed
George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code, concluding that the Code is mandated
both by the Constitution and systemic racism. First, it argues that the Court’s
death penalty jurisprudence, which emphasizes the sanctity of life, is a
superior approach to the constitutionality of lethal force compared to the
Court’s current doctrines, which is focused on police officer liability, with

146. See generally Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. La. 1964)
(involving a civil rights criminal prosecution regarding segregation activities). Judge John
Minor Wisdom, dissenting, argues: “[T]he crowning glory of American federalism . . . is the
protection the United States Constitution gives to the private citizen against all wrongful
governmental invasion of fundamental rights and freedoms . . . it makes federalism
workable.” Id. at 570–71 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (footnotes and emphasis omitted); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (holding, inter alia, that a federal remedy exists for a
violation of section 1983 even where a state remedy is available—that the intent of section
1983 was for concurrent jurisdiction to exist and state remedies need not be exhausted first).
See Part III for a brief response on the application of the abolition of lethal force and when, if
ever, it might be permissible.
147. The GFAC also complies with international law. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46,
at 13 (“In its [UN’s] General Comment 6 on the right to life under the Covenant, the
Committee stated that ‘The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the
utmost gravity’ and that states must take measures to prevent arbitrary killing by their own
security forces. All states must ensure compliance with international law and standards
including the United Nations Basic Principles on the use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, Principle 9 of which states: ‘Law enforcement officials shall not use
firearms against persons except in self-defense or defense of others against the imminent
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime
involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their
authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient
to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made
when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.’”).
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reference to the Blue Shield.148 Second, it argues that the Code’s abolition
of lethal force serves to dismantle a key feature of systemic racism, or the
Blue Code,149 that subrogates Blacks and protects white male officers from
criminal accountability for killing Blacks, which this Article refers to as
modern-day lynching.
A. Executions
As previously noted in Part I, and as illustrated in the Katrina Massacre,
the Black Lives Matter Movement faces a conundrum. That is, despite the
Constitution’s extensive provisions that protect the sanctity of life against
wrongful Government infringement, police officers are permitted to and
protected when they use deadly force. Overall, this section posits that the
policies and the practice of police use of lethal force is an unconstitutional
execution, which fails to comply with this Court’s death penalty jurisdiction.
This analysis is presented as three subsections, (1) the constitutional
protections of the sanctity of life against wrongful Government infringement
and how particularly Black lives matter, (2) an analysis of Supreme Court
decisions relative to the police use of deadly force, which effectuated the
Blue Shield, and (3) an argument why police use of lethal force policies and
practices are executions, in violation of the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence, and, therefore, must be abolished.
1. Black Lives Do Matter, Constitutionally and Statutorily
This subsection begins with an examination of the Government’s taking
of human life within the context of the Constitution.150 The Founders, in
enacting the Constitution, recognized the sanctity of life.151 In addition to
the explicit provisions in the Constitution protecting life from wrongful
Government infringement, the Supreme Court has recognized the sanctity of
life in several key cases.152 However, the Founders also adopted the then-

148.
149.
150.

See supra note 97.
See supra note 99.
See generally THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION (Bernard
Bailyn, ed., 1993).
151. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), http://www.arch
ives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (“We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
152. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (where the Court held that the
Constitution forbids the execution of the insane, it also expressly recognized the fundamental
right to life, stating: “For today, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive
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accepted principle that the Government has the authority to end a human life,
but only when subjected to strict limitations.153
Specifically, when it came to the question of how the Government could
take a life, the Founders provided utmost clarity with the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments, along with numerous due process protections against
wrongful prosecutions.154
First, the Fifth guards against wrongful
prosecutions of crimes, stating “No person shall . . . be deprived of life . . .
without due process of law.”155 Then, with restrictions on punishment,
comes the Eighth which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.”156

value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and
stripped of his fundamental right to life.” Id. at 409).
153. The Declaration of Independence reflected the common law of England, see 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 12930 (“The statute law of England does therefore
very seldom, and the common law does never, inflict any punishment extending to life or
limb, unless upon the highest necessity: and the constitution is an utter stranger to any
arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without the express warrant of law . . . . And
it is enacted by the statute 5 Edw. III. c. 9. (that no man shall be forejudged of life or limb,
contrary to the great charter and the law of the land: and again, by statute 28 Ed. III. c. 3. that
no man shall be put to death, without being brought to answer by due process of law”). Today,
the death penalty is recognized as barbaric. See generally Mythili Sampathkumar, UN
Demands America End ‘Barbaric’ Use of Death Penalty, INDEPENDENT UK (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/death.-penalty-america-undemands-end-capital-punishment-a7993706.html.
154. (1) Article I, Section 9, prohibits the federal and state governments from passing bills
of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. (2) Article I, Section 10, prohibits the federal and
state governments from passing ex post facto laws. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (3). The Fifth
Amendment expressly provides for the Grand Jury Clause (a person cannot be tried for an
offense that carries the death penalty unless indicted by a grand jury) and the Double Jeopardy
Clause (ordinarily, if a person has been tried and either acquitted or convicted and sentenced
to imprisonment, the person cannot be tried again for the same offense and sentenced to
death). U.S. CONST. amend. V. (4). A person is also entitled to the protections provided by
the Supreme Court’s expansion of the rights it deems to be fundamental, that is, substantive
due process. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (in establishing when a right is
fundamental, based on its past tests and formulations, the Court has looked to “history, legal
traditions, and practices [to] provide the crucial ‘guide-posts for responsible decisionmaking.’”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding that marriage is a
fundamental right and applied with equal force to same-sex couples).
155. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
156. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see generally John Bessler, A Century in the Making:
The Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, and the Origins of the U.S. Constitution’s
Eight Amendment, 27 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 989 (2019).
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Regardless of the constitutional allowance on the Government’s right
to execute a life, some States, and even the Supreme Court for a short time,
have found that human life is so sacred that the Government is absolutely
forbidden from taking a life.157 This prohibition is also supported by
international human rights principles and treaties, which were adopted and
ratified by the United States.158 Relative to the George Floyd Anti-Lynching
Code, the sanctity of life is embraced as a fundamental and constitutional
right that should predominate over other constitutional provisions, when in
conflict. Additionally, over the centuries, the U.S. has recognized that Black
lives are particularly vulnerable to government-sponsored abuse,159 as will
be discussed next.
Next, we will explore (1) a brief legal history of enslavement,
oppression, and discrimination of Blacks, (2) an explanation of how and why
Black lives are constitutionally and statutorily protected, and (3) evidence
that the Government has failed to protect Black lives against police killings.
African Americans have experienced a long history of State-sponsored
oppression160 and harmful discrimination.161 From its inception, the
Constitution supported the enslavement of Blacks.162 Following the Civil

157. In 1972 the US Supreme Court struck capital punishment statutes in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), reducing all death sentences pending at the time to life
imprisonment, subsequently many states passed new death penalty statutes and the court
affirmed the legality of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
158. See Eur. Convention on Human Rights art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005
(protecting the right of every person to his or her life and imposing on the state, through its
agents, to refrain from itself causing the deprivation of life and to investigate instances of
alleged unjustified use of lethal force).
159. See the Reconstruction Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments) which
sought to protect the constitutional rights of the newly freed enslaved people of African
descent. In particular, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“… No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
160. As the Confederate leadership regained power in the South, southern legislatures
enacted “black codes,” state-sanctioned, racially based controls on the lives, liberty, and
property rights of Blacks. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER
NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II
(2008).
161. See generally Meilan Solly, 58 Resources to Understand Racism in America,
SMITHSONIANMAG.COM (June 4, 2020, 11:47 AM), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
history/158-resources-understanding-systemic-racism-america-180975029/.
162. Prior to the Civil War, the Constitution protected the institution of enslavement and
did not consider Blacks as U.S. citizens. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3., or the Enumeration
Clause or Three-Fifths Compromise. Article 1, Section 9 protected the legalization of the
trade and the importation of enslaved persons of African descent (“The Migration and
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,
shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and
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War, the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution163 sought to
guarantee the legal status of Blacks as free citizens, prohibiting
enslavement,164 guaranteeing citizenship,165 and granting Black males the
right to vote.166 In 1870 and 1871, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress enacted two Enforcement Acts and the Ku Klux Klan Act, all
designed to protect Blacks from being terrorized by private citizens and
public officials.167 These statutes as embodied in Title 18; Sections 241168
and 242169 provide for criminal liability and Sections 1983 and 14141

eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for
each Person.” Id. art 1, § 9). Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, or the Fugitive Slave Clause,
required: “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom Service or
Labour may be due.” Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. See also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857) (holding that “a negro, whose ancestors were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as
slaves,” whether enslaved or free, was not and could not be a U.S. citizen).
163. The Reconstruction Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments) abolished
enslavement, guaranteed citizenship rights, and voting rights of newly freed Blacks. The
Fourteenth Amendment echoes the Fifth Amendment’s protection of the sanctity of life. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“… No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crime whereof the party shall be duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“…No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
167. See generally DAVID MARK CHALMERS, BACKFIRE: HOW THE KU KLUX KLAN HELPED
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 72–74 (2005); MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND
SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN
SOUTH (1987).
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 242; Conspiracy Against Rights [hereinafter “Conspiracy Against
Rights”], https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/federal-civil-rights-statutes (making “it
unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because
of his/her having exercised the same)”). The law was enacted and is protected pursuant to
constitutionally granted authority granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996); Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law [hereinafter
“Color of Law”], https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/federal-civil-rights-statutes
(making “it a crime for any person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
or custom to willfully deprive or cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S. This law further
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provide for civil liability.170 As will be discussed later, these federal statutes
have been deemed ineffective due to Supreme Court decisions.171
The Federal Government’s protection of Blacks was short lived.172
Following Reconstruction and the restoration of southern white
supremacy,173 the Supreme Court diminished the protective impact of the

prohibits a person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to
willfully subject or cause to be subjected any person to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, than those prescribed for punishment of citizens on account of such person being
an alien or by reason of his/her color or race. Acts under ‘color of any law’ include acts not
only done by federal, state, or local officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful
authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided
that, in order for unlawful acts of any official to be done under ‘color of any law,’ the unlawful
acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of
his/her official duties….”). There are four elements to establish offenses under this section:
(1) the victim must have been an inhabitant of a U.S. state, district, or territory when the
alleged violation occurred; (2) defendant acted under color of any law; (3) the defendant’s
conduct deprived the victim of some right secured or protected by the U.S. Constitution; and
(4) the defendant acted willfully, that is, with specific intent to violate the protected
constitutional right.
170. Civil cases may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (now 34
U.S.C. § 12601). Claims under § 1983 can be filed by citizens for civil rights violations by
persons acting under “color of law,” that is, police or other government officials. Whereas §
14141 is a civil remedy available to the government against a law enforcement agency to
correct “policies and practices that fostered the misconduct and, where appropriate, may
require individual relief for the victim(s).” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (“Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”).
171. See generally Matthew V. Hess, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 153 (1993). See also Barry C.
Scheck, Criminal Prosecution and Section 1983, 16 TOURO L. REV. 895 (2000); Addressing
Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/addressing-police-misconduct-laws-enforced-department-justice
(last updated Feb. 28, 2019); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009).
172. See generally JUAN WILLIAM, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS,
1954–1965 (1987) (documenting the Black struggle for civil rights).
173. See CHALMERS, supra note 166.
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Fourteenth Amendment;174 again exposing Black lives to renewed
exploitation, oppression, and abuse.175
Then, in 1954, the Court issued the landmark decision of Brown v.
Board of Education176 holding that racially segregated public schools were
unconstitutional.177 That decision restored Blacks’ hope that the Federal
Government and the courts would once again be an ally in their struggle for
equal justice.178 The jurisdictional posture of the Brown decision was
consistent with a series of the Court’s decisions, encompassing several of the
specific entitlements from the Bill of Rights, thereby binding the States.179
As a result, today, such civil liberties provide protection against both Federal
and State governments and are now analyzed under the auspices of
“fundamentality.”180

174. See, e.g., the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81–83 (1872) (effectively limited
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to federal rights, such as the
right to interstate travel, but not “state rights” such as intra-state travel); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (in a case where a white mob killed a hundred Blacks, the
Court ruled that the First and Second Amendments do not apply to state governments, further
restricting the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, and resulting in no convictions of the
perpetrators). However, in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began a series of decisions that
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to “incorporate” most portions of the Bill of Rights,
making these portions, for the first time, enforceable against the State governments. See, e.g.,
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (expressly holding that States were bound to
protect freedom of speech).
175. See generally JUAN WILLIAM, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS,
1954–1965 (1987) (documenting the Black struggle for civil rights).
176. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (ruling that U.S. State laws establishing racial segregation
in public schools were unconstitutional, even if the segregated schools were otherwise equal
in quality). This was followed by decades of the battle of the desegregation of public schools,
including universities. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1990) (documenting the
role federal circuit court judges played in the implementation of the Brown decision).
177. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
178. See WILLIAM, supra note 174.
179. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000).
Under Selective Incorporation, the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses to “incorporate” individual elements of the Bill of Rights against
the states. Id.
180. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 267 (3d Cir.1990) (“The test usually
articulated for determining fundamentality under the Due Process Clause is that the putative
right must be ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’, or ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”) (internal references omitted). In 2010, in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778, 791 (2010), the Court incorporated the Second Amendment’s
right to bear arms into the protection against state actions, holding that the right to bear arms
as a fundamental and individual right that will necessarily be subject to strict scrutiny by the
courts).
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In the 1960s, Blacks pressed for their constitutional rights through
peaceful civil rights protests, marches, and sit-ins.181 In 1964, in response to
the movement, Congress enacted legislation and President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964.182
Hence, the Federal Government has both a constitutional and a statutory
duty to protect Blacks from police officers who violate people’s civil
rights183 or commit hate crimes.184 The laws provide federal courts with the
jurisdiction to protect Black lives, recognizing that throughout our history,
Blacks are particularly vulnerable to both governmental and societal abuse
and should be afforded special, federal protection.185 Yet, even today, there
is no federal statute that expressly prohibits the police use of deadly force
against Blacks.186
Consequently, the Federal Government has a duty to protect Black lives
that includes investigating claims that civil rights have been violated.187
Recently, in January 2019, in furtherance of the need to monitor police
behavior, the FBI launched a national use-of-force database for officerinvolved shootings or incidents in which police used excessive force.188

181. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, HISTORY.COM., http://www.history.
com/topics/black-history/civil-rights-act (last updated Sept. 20, 2018); WILLIAM, supra note
174.
182. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (U.S. federal
anti-discrimination law protects groups of people with a common characteristic, from
discrimination on the basis of that characteristic, including race, color, religion, national
origin, and other such categories).
183. Conspiracy Against Rights, supra note 167; Color of Law, supra note 168; see also
Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/addressing-police-misconduct-laws-enforced-department-justice
(last updated Feb. 28, 2019).
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 249; Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention
Act, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/federal-civil-rights-statutes (making “it
unlawful to willfully cause bodily injury—or attempting to do so with fire, firearm, or other
dangerous weapon—when 1) the crime was committed because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin of any person, or 2) the crime was committed because of
the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity,
or disability of any person and the crime affected interstate or foreign commerce or occurred
within federal special maritime and territorial jurisdiction….”).
185. See WILLIAM, supra note 174.
186. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 17.
187. See U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1. The U.S. Justice Department has the statutory
authority to investigate alleged violations of civil rights. See generally Debra Livingston,
Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 815, 842 n.138 (1999).
188. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL USE-OF-FORCE DATA COLLECTION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/use-of-force; BUREAU OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS, SEC.
210402; Data on Use of Excessive Force, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=84; The
Marshall Project and other nonprofits have also been collecting this data prior to the FBI’s
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Unfortunately, the mere monitoring of police use of lethal force has not
saved lives, and apparently has not resulted in federal prosecutions. Relative
to the George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code, the sanctity of Black lives is
particularly embraced as a fundamental and constitutional right that should
predominate over other constitutional provisions, when in conflict.
At first glance, the civil rights statutes appear to be a compelling
authority to protect Black lives from police brutality. However, the facts
evidence otherwise.189 The Justice Department reported that federal
prosecutors declined to pursue civil rights allegations against law
enforcement officers ninety-six percent of the time.190 This reality is hard to
explain to a victim’s family who watched as a police officer callously killed
their loved ones. In order to understand this stark and painful reality, we
need to analyze the Court’s doctrines that fundamentally negate the
effectiveness of the civil rights laws.
As presented next, there are reasons why federal officials fail to
prosecute these clear violations of the civil rights of Blacks. Federal
prosecutions of police officers for use of lethal force are solidly blocked by
three Supreme Court doctrines, which eviscerate the federal civil rights laws
by constructing a high burden of proof standard for punishing police
misconduct.
2. The Court’s Blue Shield Frustrates Prosecutions.
The prior subsection explained that the sanctity of life, and particularly
of Black lives, is strongly protected by the Constitution and the federal civil
rights laws. This, however, begs the question: how is it that police officers
can blatantly terminate Black lives without accountability? This subsection
will describe three key Supreme Court doctrines relative to police
accountability. It will demonstrate that together the Court precedent grants
police officers extraordinary protections against criminal liability for
committing homicide while policing, effectively creating the Blue Shield.191

database; see MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, (updated June 30, 2020), https://mappingpolice
violence.org/; FATAL ENCOUNTERS, https://fatalencounters.org/.
189. See generally Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of
Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3207–09 (2014); Dukanovic, supra note 51.
190. Brian Bowling & Andrew Conte, Trib Investigation: Cops Often Let off Hook for
Civil Rights Complaints, TRIBLIVE (Mar. 12, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://triblive.com/usworld/
nation/9939487-74/police-rights-civil. This reality will be explored in Part III, B. This reality
will be explored in Part III, B.
191. Alison M. Smith, Overview of Selected Federal Criminal Civil Rights Statutes,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Dec. 16, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43830.pdf. “State actors” may also include prison guards, judges, and others who are acting
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The next discussion shows how the Court greatly limited the reach of the
federal civil rights, through this aforementioned Blue Shield.
a. Specific Intent to Deprive a Constitutional Right
As discussed above, the greatest sources of protecting a Black person
from police abuse are the Constitution and the civil rights laws. However,
the Court, in a narrow decision, created the first major roadblock to the
prosecution of police officers for killing Blacks.192
In 1945, in Screws v. United States,193 the Court reviewed the civil
rights act,194 which resulted in the federal conviction of a sheriff.195 This was
an all-too-familiar case, where a white male sheriff beat to death a
handcuffed Black male, accused of stealing a tire.196 In reaching its final
holding, the Court analyzed the civil rights law at issue, finding (1) the
constitutionality of the civil rights criminal act against a due process
challenge that alleged it was vague and lacked specificity,197 (2) the act
originated as an “anti-discrimination measure” that was later extended to
prohibit the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities” guaranteed
by federal law, after examining its legislative history,198 and (3) that the
legislative history indicated a desire to reduce the section’s severity as
reflected in Congress’s special requirement of intent to violate federal rights,

as public officials. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (finding that the actions
of election commissioners who conducted a primary election and willfully altered and falsely
counted and certified ballots were acts under color of state law depriving the voter of
constitutional rights); (finding that state judge may be found criminally liable for civil rights
violations). A private actor may also act “under color of law” under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
192. Id.
193. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
194. Id. at 94. In Screws, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the predecessor
of Section 242, 18 U.S.C. § 52, and upheld its constitutionality against a due process challenge
that alleged that the statute was vague and lacked the specificity constitutionally mandated
for criminal statutes. In reaching its decision, the Court examined the legislative history and
noted the section’s origins as an “anti-discrimination measure” that was later extended to
prohibit the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities” guaranteed by federal law.
The Court concluded that the legislative history indicated a desire to reduce the section’s
severity. To express this reduction in severity, Congress created a special requirement of
intent to violate federal rights, rather than just a generalized “bad purpose.”
195. 18 U.S.C. § 52 (the predecessor of today’s Section 242).
196. In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the local U.S. Attorney convened a
grand jury that indicted a sheriff, Screws, in Baker County, Georgia the lethal beating of the
handcuffed Black male, Hall. See Smith, supra note 190.
197. See Smith, supra note 190.
198. Screws, 325 U.S. at 91.
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rather than just a generalized “bad purpose.”199 The majority decision,
penned by Justice William O. Douglas, determined:
One who does act with such specific intent is aware that what
he does is precisely that which the statute forbids . . . He violates the
statute not merely because he has a bad purpose but because he acts
in defiance of announced rules of law.200
Using this narrow construction, the Court reversed the conviction
against the sheriff, concluding that the jury should have been instructed on
the specific intent to deprive the victim of a constitutional right.201 Following
this precedent, federal courts have interpreted Screws to strictly construe the
federal authority to prosecute a civil rights violation.202 Arguably, the
specific intent requirement established in Screws makes a federal
prosecution nearly impossible, requiring the prosecutor to show (1) the
accused’s intent to violate the victim’s federal rights, (2) the action was done
under “color of law,” and (3) the force was unreasonable, unnecessary, and
unprovoked.203 As a result, a strict interpretation of section 242 has been
uniformly followed by federal courts,204 requiring proof of the defendant’s
specific intent to deprive a victim of a constitutional or federal right.205
Hence, due to the Screws’ precedent,206 relative to police use of lethal
force, the current federal laws fail to result in the successful federal

199. Id.
200. Id. at 106.
201. Then, upon retrial, the Government failed to prove that the sheriff’s willful intent to
deprive the Black victim of his constitutional rights when he killed him. Screws, 325 U.S. at
101. See CHALMERS, supra note 166.
202. See, e.g., U.S. v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (stating, “[e]ven the
specific intent to injure, or the reckless use of excessive force, without more, does not satisfy
the requirements of 242 as construed in Screws. There must exist an intention to ‘punish or
to prevent the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to vote, or to
obtain equal protection of the law.” Id. at 501).
203. See Smith, supra note 190.
204. See Smith, supra note 190.
205. See United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156 (3rd Cir. 1972) (stating, “Thus we
conclude that in a criminal prosecution under 242, it is only where there is supportive evidence
found by the fact finder of a willful intention to deprive another of his constitutional rights
that the federal statute comes into play. It is one thing to be guilty of excessive force, and thus
chargeable with violating the law of the state and territory; it is quite another for a policeman
to administer a physical beating as punishment for allegedly breaking the law. In the latter
case the police offer has acted as prosecutor, judge, and jury; he has brought the charges,
found the suspect guilty, administered punishment.” Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
206. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 91.

BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS

38

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 48:1

investigations and prosecutions of wrongdoers.207 This fact became clear
following the shootings of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and of Michael Brown in
2014.208
Each case demonstrates that a police officer’s wrongdoings are greatly
shielded from federal criminal liability,209 as the Screws decision practically
bars the Federal Government from charging a police officer for the wrongful
use of lethal force, making it the local authorities’ sole responsibility.210
The Screws case raised the burden of proof standard and, thereby,
diminished the application of the civil rights laws. It is still precedent and
continues to frustrate federal prosecution for civil rights violations.211 We
continue with a second Supreme Court doctrine, qualified immunity, and
explain how police accountability remains frustrated.
b. Qualified Immunity Exempts Police from Liability212
Next, we present the second Court doctrine that frustrates the
constitutional mandate to protect a person’s life from wrongful governmental
infringements, with (1) a brief history of the development of the Court’s

207. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., FY 2014 PERFORMANCE BUDGET:
CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 20–21 (2014) (reporting that in cases brought in 2011, out of
10,000 complaints, only 224 officers were charged); Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, Police
Use of Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years after Garner, 35 ST LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 109 (2016);
Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using Congressional
Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 370 (2011).
208. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 206. Then-U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder called on Congress to lower the bar on the standard the Justice
Department must meet to prosecute civil rights cases. Moreover, under then-President Barack
Obama, the Justice Department aggressively investigated police shootings.
209. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 206.
210. See infra Part III, B, for a discussion of the obstacles that police departments and
local prosecutors have in bringing such prosecutions.
211. Under state and federal law, including all provisions of the Civil Rights Act, Sections
241, 242, and 1983, it is difficult for the prosecution to succeed in such claims, if the
investigation ever gets to that stage. Police Avoided Federal Civil Rights Charges in 96% of
Cases over 20 Years––Report, RT (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.rt.com/usa/335602-policecivil-right-charges/ (“Based on analysis of nearly 3 million records from the US Department
of Justice’s National Caseload Data, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review found that the 94 US
Attorney offices declined 12,703 referrals of potential civil rights violations made by the FBI
and other agencies out of a total of 13,233 complaints.”); cf. Marc Debbaudt, Legislation
Calling for Independent Police Prosecutor Is Unnecessary, L.A. ASS’N DEPUTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS (June 9, 2015), https://www.laadda.com/legislation-calling-for-independent-poli
ce-prosecutor-is-unnecessary/; Eric Lichtblau, Bush Sees U.S. as Meddling in Local Police
Affairs, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jun/01/news/mn-36333.
212. See generally Colin Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 468 (2011); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified
Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62 (2016).
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doctrine of “qualified immunity,”213 (2) followed by an argument that this
doctrine wrongfully precludes claims against police officers who harm
Blacks.214
The Enforcement Acts and the Ku Klux Klan Act215 were specifically
enacted to protect Blacks from State-sponsored, white supremacists’
retaliation and oppression following the Civil War and Reconstruction.216 As
previously mentioned, the effect of these provisions was short lived217 and
later solidly negated by Supreme Court decisions, including and following
Screws, which greatly reduced criminal liability.218 However, in 1961
Monroe v. Pape,219 the Court changed its approach to the prosecution of civil
actions for police brutality cases, permitting such claims to move forward
without restrictions.220 Hence, it was arguably within the context of
increasing civil rights claims in federal court that the Court adopted the
doctrine of qualified immunity.221

213. See generally Legal Information Institute, Qualified Immunity, CORNELL LAW,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/qualified_immunity (“Specifically, qualified immunity
protects a government official from lawsuits alleging that the official violated a plaintiff's
rights, only allowing suits where officials violated a ‘clearly established’ statutory or
constitutional right. When determining whether or not a right was ‘clearly established,’ courts
consider whether a hypothetical reasonable official would have known that the defendant’s
conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights. Courts conducting this analysis apply the law that was
in force at the time of the alleged violation, not the law in effect when the court considers the
case…. Qualified immunity is not immunity from having to pay money damages, but rather
immunity from having to go through the costs of a trial at all. Accordingly, courts must resolve
qualified immunity issues as early in a case as possible, preferably before discovery.”).
214. See generally Amir H. Ali & Emily Clark, Qualified Immunity: Explained, THE
APPEAL (June 20, 2019), https://theappeal.org/qualified-immunity-explained/ (noting “[t]his
standard shields law enforcement, in particular, from innumerable constitutional violations
each year. In the Supreme Court’s own words, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.’ It is under this rule that officers can, without worry,
drag a nonthreatening, seven months pregnant woman into the street and tase (sic) her three
times for refusing to sign a piece of paper.”); Jamie Ehrlich, The Question Before the Supreme
Court Is Who Polices the Police, CNN (June 3, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/06/03/politics/supreme-court-qualified-immunity-police-accountability-george-floyd/
index.html.
215. See infra Part III, A, 2, these laws were enacted in 1870 and 1871 and currently
embodied in Sections 241, 242, and 1983.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that the purpose of Section 1983
was “to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities
by an official’s abuse of his position.”).
220. Id.
221. See Ali & Clark, supra note 213.
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From the Court’s initial adoptions of qualified immunity, the doctrine
was used to minimize police officers’ personal liability for wrongdoings.222
In 1967, in Pierson v. Ray,223 the Court first introduced the doctrine of
qualified immunity.224 This allowed for police officers to escape from
personal liability from being sued for civil rights violations under Section
1983,225 so long as they acted in “good faith” and believed that their conduct
was authorized by law.226 However, in 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents,227 the Court decided that claimants had a federal cause of
action for damages, if a federal official violated a restricted list of
constitutional rights.228
Throughout the 1980s, the Court continuously and drastically expanded
the qualified immunity defense. In 1982, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,229 the
Court held that the protection afforded to public officials would no longer

222. Id.
223. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (relative to exonerating police officers from
personal liability, the Court justified the need for qualified immunity by reasoning that “[a]
policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction
of duty if he does not arrest when he had probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he
does.” Id. at 555).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. (that “[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being
charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he had probable cause and being
mulcted in damages if he does.”).
227. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that while
there is no explicit right to file a civil lawsuit against federal government officials who have
violated the Fourth Amendment, this right can be inferred. This is because a constitutional
protection would not be meaningful if there were no way to seek a remedy for a violation of
it). Parenthetically, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether qualified immunity
applied, as the Court of Appeals had not rules on that issue.
228. Id. However, not all Constitutional violations give rise to a Bivens cause of action,
in addition to the Fourth Amendment which was in Bivens, the Court recognized such claims
for violations of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component of due process in Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) and the Eighth Amendment in Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 25 (1980). See generally Actions Against Federal Agencies and Officers, 14 FED.
PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3655 (4th ed.).
229. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding “that [federal] government
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 818). The Court
reasoned that “the need to protect officials who are required to exercise discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.” Id. at 800.
The Court noted that [w]e emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages
arising from actions within the scope of an official’s duties and in ‘objective’ good faith. We
express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be
available.” Id. at 819, fn. 34. This case involved White House aides to former President
Nixon, not law enforcement officers.
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turn on whether the official acted in “good faith.”230 Instead, an official, even
when acting in a malicious manner and violating a person’s constitutional
rights, is immune from personal liability unless the claimant could show that
the right was “clearly established.”231 Equally significantly, in Harlow, the
Court pronounced that qualified immunity had a preemptive procedural role,
one that denied a claimant’s right to proceed in federal court.232
Relative to liability for police brutality, the Court quickly applied this
broad concept of qualified immunity to limit personal liability in Fourth
Amendment searches. In 1986, in Malley v. Briggs,233 the Court held that
qualified immunity does not apply to a police officer when the officer
wrongfully arrests someone on the basis of a warrant, but only if the officer
could not have reasonably believed that there was probable cause for the
warrant.234 Then, in 1987, in Anderson v. Creighton,235 the Court again
applied a broad interpretation of qualified immunity, holding that, when an
officer of the law (here, an FBI officer) conducts a search and violates the
Fourth Amendment, that officer is entitled to qualified immunity, if the
officer proves that a reasonable officer could have believed that the search
constitutionally complied with the Fourth Amendment.236
Fourteen years later, the Court reiterated its pronouncement in Harlow
on the uniquely preemptive procedural role of qualified immunity. In 2001,
in Saucier v. Katz,237 the Court held that a ruling on a qualified immunity

230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808 (the Court noted, quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978):
Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the
possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim
for relief . . . , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court
recognized in Scheuer that damages suits concerning constitutional violations
need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion
for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. . . . In responding to
such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not
harassed by frivolous lawsuits.
Butz, 438 U.S. 507-08 (citations omitted). (emphasis added).
Id. at 457.
233. Malley v. Briggs, 457 U.S. 335 (1986),
234. Reasonability is determined by the action that an objectively reasonable officer
would take.
235. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
236. See id. at 636. The relevant question that a court should ask is whether a reasonable
officer could have believed the warrantless search to be lawful, considering clearly established
law and the information which the officer possessed. The Supreme Court also held that
“subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant.”
237. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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defense must be made early in the trial court’s proceeding, because qualified
immunity is a defense to stand trial, not merely a defense from liability.238
The Court elaborated a two-part test or sequence for whether a government
official is entitled to qualified immunity: (1) a court must look at whether the
facts indicate that a constitutional right has been violated and (2) if so, a court
must then look at whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged conduct. Thus, the Saucier test for qualified immunity will apply,
unless the officer’s conduct clearly violated a suspect’s constitutional
right(s).239 This test has been criticized as stifling the development of
constitutional rights.240 However, in 2009, in Pearson v. Callahan,241 the
Court restricted the application of the Saucier test,242 holding that the Saucier
sequencing does not need to be applied in qualified immunity claims.243
Furthermore, the Court broadly increased the application of qualified
immunity to searches.244
Despite its expansive application of the doctrine, the Court recognized
an exception to qualified immunity. In 2002, in Hope v. Pelzer,245 the Court
found that an officer does not have qualified immunity where his cruelty was
“so obvious” that he should have had “fair warning” that his actions were
unconstitutional and contrary to the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual

238. When there is a summary judgment motion for qualified immunity, the court should
rule on the motion, even if a material issue of fact remains on the underlying claim.
239. Id.
240. See generally Ted Sampsell Jones et al., Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 623 (2011) (discussing that the Court’s retreat from the mandatory Saucier
order was due to the lower courts’ difficulty in applying the mandatory Saucier framework);
Pierre N. Level, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 NYU L. REV. 1249
(2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s command in Saucier that before dismissing a
constitutional tort suit by reason of good faith immunity, a court must first declare in dictum
where the alleged conduct violates the Constitution, is ill advised).
241. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
242. Id. at 227.
243. Rather, a trial court should have more discretion in whether it should apply Saucier,
536 U.S. 730 (2002).
244. Id. at 243–44. (“[a]n officer conducting a search is entitled to qualified immunity
where clearly established law does not show that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment.”); see also Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009),
where the Court held that even when an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be safe from
unreasonable search and seizure is violated, the person performing the search may still be
immune under qualified immunity, if “clearly established law does not show that the search
violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 243.
245. Saucier, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (in that case, corrections officers disciplined a prisoner
by handcuffing him to a hitching post for seven hours, with his hands above his shoulders,
shirtless in the summer sun, and being taunted the prisoner by giving water to a guard dog in
plain sight).
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punishment standard.246 As a result, the Court affirmed the denial of a
motion for summary judgement.247 This case has not taken hold to diminish
the effectiveness of qualified immunity which is under attack by civil rights
proponents and others as will be discussed next.
Qualified immunity has been sharply criticized for various reasons,248
particularly because it hinders the protection and development of civil
rights.249 Relative to the lives of Blacks, the doctrine protects police officers
from being personally accountable, even when an officer clearly violated a
person’s federal or constitutional rights.250 One study concluded that
qualified immunity “has become a nearly failsafe tool to let police brutality
go unpunished and deny victims their constitutional rights.251
Pursuant of the accountability for police officers’ killings of Blacks, the
Movement recently advocated for the end of qualified immunity in excessive
force cases.252 However, on June 15, 2020, in Baxter v. Bracey,253 where an

246. Saucier, 536 U.S. at 741.
247. Id. at 736–48 (the defense of qualified immunity was precluded at the summary
judgment phase, noting “The Eighth Amendment violation here is obvious on the facts
alleged. Any safety concerns had long since abated by the time Hope was handcuffed to the
hitching post, because he had already been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and
transported back to prison … Despite the clear lack of emergency, respondents knowingly
subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, unnecessary pain, unnecessary exposure
to the sun, prolonged thirst and taunting, and a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a
risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.”
248. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, YALE L.J. (2017), retrieved
Feb. 26, 2020).
249. See Ali & Clark, supra note 213 (noting that qualified immunity hinders the
protection of civil rights in three ways: (1) victims of brutality or harassment by law
enforcement generally get no relief in court and have no ability to hold offending officers
accountable for their actions, (2) many claims will never be brought to court in the first place,
acting as a disincentive for lawyers to bring such claims, and (3) “freezes” the development
of constitutional law, instead of reviewing, analyzing, and applying constitutional doctrine to
determine whether a person’s rights were violated.
250. See Ian Millhiser, Why Police Can Violate your Constitutional Rights and Suffer No
Consequences in Court, VOX (June 3, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/3/21277104/
qualified-immunity-cops-constitution-shaniz-west-supreme-court; John P. Gross, Qualified
Immunity and the Use of Force: Making the Reckless into the Reasonable, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L.
L. REV. 67 (2017); Jordan S. Rubin et al., How the Law Shields Cops From Suit: Qualified
Immunity Explained, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 5, 2020, 2:46 PM), https://news.bloom
berglaw.com/us-law-week/how-the-law-shields-cops-from-suit-qualified-immunity-explaine
d?context=article-related; Andrew Satter, Qualified Immunity: Origins of a Police Liability
Shield (Video) BLOOMBERG LAW (July 24, 2020, 1:47 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.
com/us-law-week/qualified-immunity-origins-of-a-police-liability-shield-video.
251. See Andrew Chung et al., Special Report: For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court
Protection, REUTERS (May 30, 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20200612051417/
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-immunity-scotus-specialrep-idUSKBN22K18C.
252. See generally id.
253. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020).
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appellate federal court applied qualified immunity when a police officer
unleashed attack dogs on a suspect, after the suspect had been
apprehended,254 the Court declined to review the doctrine.255 Further, from
a legislative prospective, members of Congress have proposed bills to end
qualified immunity when applied to police violations of federal rights, but
with no success to date.256
The frequency of such cases has prompted a growing chorus of criticism
from lawyers, legal scholars, civil rights groups, politicians and even judges
that qualified immunity, as applied, is unjust,257 including members of the
Court.258 Spanning the political spectrum, this broad coalition says the

254. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020). Parenthetically, Justice Clarence Thomas
dissented to this decision, stating that qualified immunity should be reformed to allow
individuals a right to sue state officers for damages and to remedy violations of the
individuals’ constitutional rights.
255. See Jamie Ehrlich et al., Supreme Court Declines to Weigh in on Legal Doctrine that
Shields Law Enforcement, CNN (June 15, 2020, 11:57 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/
15/politics/supreme-court-qualified-immunity/index.html (reporting “[i]n recent years, legal
scholars, judges and justices on all sides of the ideological spectrum have criticized the legal
doctrine known as “qualified immunity,” arguing that it is not grounded in the proper legal
authorities and too often shields officials from accountability.”); Jamie Ehrlich et al., Federal
Judge Pens Scathing Opinion on Qualified Immunity: ‘Let Us Waste No Time in Righting This
Wrong’, CNN (Aug. 4, 2020, 9:52 PM), http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2020/images/08/04/jamisonv-mcclendon.pdf (providing a history of Black people’s battles against police brutality).
256. See David Morgan, U.S. Lawmaker Prepares Bill Aiming to End Court Protection
for Police, REUTERS (June 4, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-policecongress/u-s-lawmaker-prepares-bill-aiming-to-end-court-protection-for-policeidUSKBN23831W; see, e.g., Harris, Markey, Booker Introduce Senate Resolution to Abolish
Qualified Immunity for Law Enforcement, Hold Officers Accountable for Police Brutality,
WEBSITE OF U.S. SENATOR FOR CALIFORNIA KAMALA HARRIS (June 3, 2020); The Ending
Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2019-2020); Seth Stoughton et al., How to
Actually
Fix
America’s
Police,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/how-actually-fix-americaspolice/612520/.
257. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45
(2018); Tahir Duckett, Unreasonably Immune: Rethinking Qualified Immunity in Fourth
Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (2016); John C. Jeffries Jr.,
What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FL. L. REV. 851 (2010).
258. See, e.g., Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1277 (2017), where in reviewing the U.S. Fifth Circuit’s granted of
summary judgment for the respondent, a Houston police officer, who shot the petitioner in
the back, the Court denied certiorari, with Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg dissenting and
noting, “The question whether the officer used excessive force in shooting Salazar-Limon
thus turns in large part on which man is telling the truth. Our legal system entrusts this
decision to a jury sitting as finder of fact, not a judge reviewing a paper record.” See Debra
Cassens Weiss, Sotomayor Sees “Disturbing Trend” of Failing to Intervene on Behalf of
Victims of Police Shootings, AM. BAR J. (Apr. 24, 2017, 3:35 PM), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/sotomayor_sees_disturbing_trend_of_failing_to_intervene_on_behalf_of_
victim/.

BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS

Fall 2020

BLACK LIVES MATTER

45

doctrine has become a failsafe tool to permit police brutality to go
unpunished and deny victims their constitutional rights.259
While qualified immunity is broad, it is not absolute.260 For example,
a police officer, even while policing, can still be sued for intentionally
violating a person’s constitutional rights, although intent is hard to prove.261
Further, State criminal codes provide that any police action not sanctioned
by the police department that is found to be illegal may lead to criminal
charges.262
In summary, the Court has inserted the immunity doctrine as an
additional procedural and substantive barrier to holding police officers
accountable for brutality. In doing so, they added to the Screws case in
raising the burden of proof standard and, thereby, diminishing the
application of the civil rights laws. However, the Court’s protection of police
misdoings does not stop there. In rare instance, where federal or state
charges are made against rogue police officers, those officers are additionally
protected by another Court doctrine, as will be discussed next.
c. “Objective Reasonableness”
Objective reasonableness, in combination with the two Court-generated
doctrines already discussed, creates a nearly impenetrable legal shield which
protects police officers from being held criminally liable for killing
Blacks.263 The following analysis of the Court’s doctrine shows (1) the
parameters of the doctrine and (2) argues why it fails to protect Black lives
against police killings.
The Court’s doctrine of objective reasonableness results from its
development of a Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” approach to
analyzing police use of lethal or excessive force. This approach was
developed in two cases, the first, in 1985, in Tennessee v. Garner264 and the
second, in 1989, in Graham v. Connor.265 The doctrine creates a very high

259. See generally Baude, supra note 256.
260. See generally Baude, supra note 256.
261. See Marcus Nemeth, How was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development of
Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C.K. REV. 989
(2019).
262. Under qualified immunity, the managers of police officers are also exempt from
personal liability, contrary to respondeat superior, although the municipality or employing
body is still civilly liable for the wrongdoing. See Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, (2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/061520zor_f2bh.pdf.
263. See Jill I. Brown, Defining ‘Reasonable’ Police Conduct: Graham v. Connor and
Excessive Force During Arrest, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1257–1286 (1991).
264. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
265. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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barrier for indicting a police officer for using lethal force—needing to
overcome the presumption that the officer believed at the time of the killing
that his or another’s life was at risk.266 To understand the nature of that
standard of culpability, we will (1) present the Garner Court’s adoption of
the Fourth Amendment basis for assessing excessive force, (2) review the
bases for the Graham Court’s expansion of the Garner analysis, and (3)
critique the Graham Court’s objective reasonableness standard.
We begin in 1985, with Tennessee v. Garner,267 in which the Court
found the use of deadly force to prevent escape was an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of probable cause that the
fleeing suspect posed a physical danger.268 In reaching its decision, the Court
adopted a Fourth Amendment’s “search and seizure” analysis to assess the
legality of excessive force, in lieu of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process approach.269 In doing so, the Court set forth instances in which an
officer’s use of deadly force is reasonable.270 However, the Court framed
the legal issue as one based on “the totality of the circumstances,” weighing
the nature of the intrusion of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights against
the government interests which justified the intrusion.271 In this particular
case, the Court found in favor of the suspect.272

266. See infra discussion of the Graham decision.
267. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Justice Byron White, writing for the majority; reviewed
the facts that, on October 3, 1974, a Memphis police officer fatally shot a fleeing, unarmed
suspect, a fifteen-year-old, as he began to climb a fence. In a civil case, the officer relied on
a Tennessee state statute and official Memphis Police Department policy authorizing deadly
force against a fleeing suspect. The statute provided that, "if, after notice of the intention to
arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary
means to effect the arrest.” The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.).
268. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
269. Id. at 7 (“apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment”).
270. Id. (the Court stating (1) when threatened with a deadly weapon; (2) when the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses an imminent threat of serious harm or
death to the officer or to others; or (3) when probable cause exists that the suspect has
committed a crime involving threatened or actual serious physical harm or death to another.
271. Id.
272. The Court noted that as the use of deadly force against a subject is the most intrusive
type of seizure possible, because it deprives the suspect of his life, and that the state failed to
present evidence that its interest in shooting unarmed fleeing suspects outweighs the suspect’s
interest in his own survival. The Court concluded, “[a] police officer may not seize an
unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead.” Id. at 11.
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Four years later, in 1989, in Graham v. Connor,273 the Court elaborated
on Garner’s approach to the boundaries of the police use of lethal force.274
In Graham, the Court held that the lower court had incorrectly applied a test
that focused on an officer’s subjective motivations.275 Instead, the Court held
that the standard should be whether a police officer used an objectively
unreasonable amount of force under the Fourth Amendment “search and
seizure” analysis.276
Prior to Graham, the federal courts had used the Due Process analysis
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to regulate the Government’s
abuse of civil rights, along with the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual
punishment” analysis for in police custodial abuse cases.277 However, in
Graham, the Court rejected the notion that the judiciary should use the Due
Process Clause, instead of the Fourth Amendment, in analyzing an excessive
force claim.”278 In its decision, the Graham Court provided the basis for
what constituted reasonableness, asserting that it applied to what is
reasonable “under the given circumstances.”279

273. Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). The facts of the case are worth mentioning. The
plaintiff, Dethorne Graham, a Black man, who suffered from type 1 diabetes entered a
convenience store to get orange juice but seeing a long line decided to leave. The defendant,
Connor, a Black police officer, became suspicious and pulled Graham over for an
investigative stop to determine what he was doing at the store. When backup officers arrived,
one of the officers rolled Graham over on the sidewalk and applied handcuffs tightly behind
Graham's back. Several officers then lifted the still-unconscious body of Graham and put him
face down on the hood a car. Then four officers picked up Graham and threw him headfirst
into the back of a police car. Once Officer Connor confirmed that Graham had done nothing
wrong at the convenience store, the officers drove him home and released him. Due to the
police encounter, Graham suffered a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and
an injured shoulder.
274. Id. at 395.
275. Graham, 490 U.S. 386, at 397-98 (1989).
276. Id. at 395.
277. Id.
278. Id. (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide
for analyzing these claims.”) Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
stated, “Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an
arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396. Further, the Court stated that all claims that
law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment [search and seizure] and its ‘reasonableness’ standard. Id. at 399.
279. Id. (“Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable
of precise definition or mechanical application,” the test’s “proper application requires careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”).

BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS

48

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 48:1

In Graham, the Court held that determining the objective
reasonableness of a particular seizure under the Fourth Amendment
“requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.”280 As such, the Graham Court’s inquiry
requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances from the officer’s
perspective.281 As a result, the Graham decision is the prevailing standard
for determining whether a police officer’s use of force is excessive or
justified—whether a police officer reasonably believed his or her life, or the
life of another, was being threatened at that time.282
This doctrine is misguided for two reasons: (1) it promotes overpolicing by treating every police encounter as a “search” and (2) condones
the use of lethal force by granting police virtually absolute immunity from
criminal liability in the policing of nonfelonious suspects. First, its
application is overly broad as it wrongly views all lethal or excessive force
cases as seizures strongly protected by the Fourth Amendment,283 ignoring
the sanctity of life, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.284 This fatal constitutional misdirection sets in motion a

280. Graham, 490 U.S. 386. at 394 (“Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in
the context of an arrest . . . it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections
of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons
. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.’”).
281. Id. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 2022).
282. See Osagie K. Obasogie et al., The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police
Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1465 (2018) (noting, that based on an empirical study, the Court’s
adoption of the Fourth Amendment did not reflect a preexisting trend or consensus in the
federal courts and has contributed to the perpetuation of police excessive use of force in many
communities of color).
283. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (1989) (“Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises
in the context of an arrest . . . it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections
of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons
. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.”).
284. Cf., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), in the context of highspeed police pursuit of a motorcyclist, the Court has rejected a Fourth Amendment approach
and instead used a Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis. Id. at 836–37. In a Section
1983 claim against the sheriff’s deputy who caused their son’s death, based on deprivation of
their son’s substantive due process right to life, while addressing a circuit split on the
culpability level required to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation in high-speed pursuit
cases, the Lewis Court also specifically rejected a Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at 836.
The Court was presented with the question of whether deliberate or reckless indifference was
enough to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation, or whether the higher “shock the
conscience” standard must be met. The Court held that the shock the conscience standard
was applicable stating that “only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of
arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for
a due process violation.” Id. at 836.
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restrictive approach to judging police misconduct, unintentionally permitting
wrongdoing to go unpunished. Viewing a police officer’s lethal shooting as
the apprehension of a suspect and, therefore, a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment is deficient protection of the suspect’s right to life: it ignores
other controlling principles of constitutional law and deprives the law of
moral principles. This results in over-policing, as the Court grants police
officers, with already pervasive authority, absolute criminal immunity from
harming or even killing people. Consequently, police officers have virtually
unfettered “search and seizure” authority in an arrest or investigatory stop.285
The overextension of Graham is illustrated in 2014, in Plumhoff v.
Rickard.286 There the Court found that officers did not use excessive force
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when they killed a motorist and
passenger by shooting fifteen times into their fleeing vehicle.287 Looking at
the totality of the circumstances, the Court concluded that the officers acted
reasonably as the driver’s reckless driving posed a grave public safety risk
and under those circumstances the firing of fifteen shots was not
excessive.288 Hence, the Court’s “objective reasonableness” test promotes
police brutality and does not deter or address the authority to use lethal

285. See, e.g., William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police
Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551 (1984); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment (1974) MINN. L. REV. 848, https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1847&context=mlr.
286. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014).
287. Id. The car was originally pulled over for an inoperable taillight, however, the Court
found that the high-speed car chase that ensued endangered the lives of both the police, and
bystanders.
288. Id. at 766 (according to the Court, “a reasonable officer could have concluded that
[the driver] was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was allowed to do so, he would
once again pose a deadly threat to others.”).
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force,289 and extends protection beyond the “rule of necessity” adopted by
reputable law enforcement agencies.290
Another example of how the Graham standard produces tragic
consequences is the killing of Tamir Rice.291 In that case, a police officer
was allowed to legally kill an unarmed child, because the officer stated he
“reasonably believed” (objectively assessed) that the child was a threat to

289. The Court continues to reaffirm its commitment to its Graham jurisprudence; see,
e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1543–44 (2017) (reviewing the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s “provocation” rule, by which officers found to have
acted reasonably on one Fourth Amendment claim could, nevertheless, be held liable for that
action based on a separate Fourth Amendment violation that contributed to their need to use
that force); id. at 1543. The Court held that rule should be barred as it conflicts with Graham
regarding the manner in which a claim of excessive force against a police officer should be
determined in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of a plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights). There, in a unanimous decision, the Court reiterated its controversial
standard for assessing police criminal liability in lethal force cases. Id at 1548; see also Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (barring courts from considering a police officer’s
subjective motivations for making police stops and conducting). In rejecting the Ninth
Circuit’s “provocation rule,” the Court upheld the standard outlined in Graham as the “settled
and exclusive framework” for excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
1548.
290. Memorandum on Resolution 14, supra note 20:
The Department of Justice hereby establishes a uniform policy with respect to the
use of deadly force in both custodial and non-custodial situations . . . . [T]he
touchstone of the Department’s policy regarding the use of deadly force is
necessity. Use of deadly force must be objectively reasonable under all the
circumstances known to the officer at the time . . . .
Deadly force should never be used upon mere suspicion that a crime, no matter how
serious, was committed, or simply upon the officer’s determination that probable
cause would support the arrest of the person being pursued or arrested for the
commission of a crime. Deadly force may be used to prevent the escape of a fleeing
subject if there is probable cause to believe: (1) the subject has committed a felony
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury or death,
and (2) the escape of the subject would pose an imminent danger of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or to another person.
See also Olevia Boykin et al., Opinion, A Better Standard for the Use of Deadly Force, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/a-better-standard-for-theuse-of-deadly-force.html?_r=0 (suggesting the adoption of a necessity rule—does not permit
deadly force if non-deadly or less deadly alternatives are available and adequate to meet the
threat); J. Michael McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force: Safe and Effective Policing
Requires Retention of the Reasonable Belief Standard, THE CHAMPION, May 2015 at 26, 27.
291. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan et al., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland Police,
Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 01/23/us/intamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-one.html (reporting on
the November 22, 2014 case of Tamir Rice, a twelve year old Black male, killed in a
Cleveland park by a white male police officer, who claims the boy had a pistol, which turned
out to be a toy, in which the grand jury failed to indict).
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himself, his fellow officer, and potentially to others.292 Under the Graham
standard, this would apply even where the child was thirty feet away from
the officer and was walking away with his or her back facing the officer.
This doctrine is devoid of moral principles and disregards the sanctity of life.
This doctrine places the burden of proof on the (sometimes deceased) victim,
to show that the officer’s action was unjustified. This leads to the question
under Graham—when is an officer’s use of lethal force ever unjustified?293
The second critique is the Graham doctrine grants police officers
virtually absolute immunity against criminal liability. This is contrary to the
Court’s better approach to protecting lives, as it established in civil liability
cases, using a Fourteenth Amendment “due process” analysis, which relies
on a “shock the conscious” approach.294 This critique was embraced by the
Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis295 decided in line with Graham. In
a Section 1983 claim against the sheriff’s deputy who caused a young male’s
death, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment approach and instead used a
Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis.296 The Court held that the
shock the conscience standard was applicable stating that “only a purpose to
cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element
of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process
violation.”297
Relying on Graham v. Connor, the Court explained that, under Section
1983, if a particular Constitutional Amendment “provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive
due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”298 But the Court
reasoned that a police pursuit was neither a search nor a seizure and therefore
does not fall under a Fourth Amendment analysis but rather under the
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process protection of a person’s

292. Id. This would apply even where the child was thirty feet away from the officer and
was walking away with his back facing the officer.
293. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, North Charleston Police Shooting Not Justified, Experts
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/us/north-charlestonpolice-shooting-not-justified-experts-say.html?_r=2; Eric Tucker, When Can Police Use
Lethal Force Against a Fleeing Suspect?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Apr. 8, 2015, 4:17 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/can-police-use-lethal-force-fleeing-suspect/.
See
also infra Introduction in the recent killings of Rayshard Brooks, George Floyd, and Breonna
Taylor, the officers’ lives nor the lives of others were not at risk.
294. See infra Part III, B (subject to the usual due process protections including the
presumption of innocence).
295. Cty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
296. See id. at 83637 (1998).
297. Id. at 836.
298. Id. at 842.
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life.299 Thus, the Court reiterated a substantive due process approach that
emphasized the sanctity of life, inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment,
explaining that its prior cases have held the amendment to guarantee “more
than fair process,” to include a “substantive sphere” which bars “certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.”300
In summary, the Graham doctrine unintentionally condones police use
of excessive force and results in a substantial barrier to investigations and
prosecutions of such incidents.301 The Court’s “objective reasonableness”
standard defies reality. Handcuffed and pinned on his stomach by three
police officers in a chokehold for nearly nine minutes, George Floyd posed
no threat.302 Running away from the police after a peaceful interrogation,
Rayshard Brooks posed no threat.303 Sleeping in her bed in her home,
Breonna Taylor posed no threat.304 Clearly, the life of the law has not been
logic,305 nor has it been moral.

* * *

299. The Court stated,
The Fourth Amendment covers only “searches and seizures,” neither of which
took place here. No one suggests that there was a search, and our cases foreclose
finding a seizure. We held in California v. Hodari D., that a police pursuit in
attempting to seize a person does not amount to a “seizure” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. And in Brower v. County of Inyo, we explained that
“a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally
caused termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the innocent
passerby), nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and
governmentally desired termination of an individual’s freedom of movement
(the fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom
of movement through means intentionally applied (emphasis added).” We
illustrated the point by saying that no Fourth Amendment seizure would take
place where a “pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show
of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit,” but
accidentally stopped the suspect by crashing into him. That is exactly this case.
Id. at 833–845.
300. Cty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S.. at 840 (first quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 719 (1997); then Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
301. See Obasogie et al., supra note 281, AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 2.
302. See Hill, supra note 4.
303. See Oliviero et al., supra note 10.
304. See Campos-Flores et al., supra note 2.
305. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) (observing “[t]he life of
the law has not been logic but experience”).
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The Court’s construction of the Blue Shield—judicial doctrines of
willful intent, qualified immunity, and objective reasonableness—makes it
practically impossible to successfully prosecute a police officer for using
lethal force.306 These extraordinary legal safeguards greatly protect police
officers from being convicted for unjustified killings of Blacks. Hence, the
Court’s current jurisprudence on police accountability creates unequal
justice, tilting the scales of justice by heavily weighing in favor of the
perpetrator and against the victim.
In response to the Court-created Blue Shield, this Article contends that,
from the viewpoint of saving Black lives, the Court’s current doctrines are
morally bankrupt, as they devalue life, unfairly protect rogue police officers,
and promote reckless or wanton shootings by police officers. It proposed the
adoption of the GFAC which challenges the constitutionality of the authority
and practices in the use of excessive force. In doing so, it rightfully shifts
the conversation from whether a particular officer’s action was justified
under the circumstances to whether the State has the authority to take a
person’s life pursuant to a search or an arrest. Further, it places greater
weight on the sanctity of life and less on over-policing of innocent suspects.
In support of the GFAC, this Article posits that the Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence should be the controlling authority to assess the
constitutionality of police use of lethal force. This thesis is fleshed out by
(1) examining the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence and (2) arguing that
police use of lethal force policies and practices do not comply with the
Court’s strict restrictions on executions, as discussed next.
3. The Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence Prohibits Police Use of
Lethal Force
The sanctity of life against government infringement has been
constitutionally recognized and protected in the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence, which arguably should apply to police use of lethal force
cases. The GFAC is based on the contention that the policies and practices
of deadly force are unconstitutional violations of the Court’s death penalty

306. Tom Jackman et al., Charging Officers with Crimes Is Still Difficult for Prosecutors,
WASH. POST (May 29, 2020 7:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/
05/29/charging-cops-with-crimes-is-still-difficult-prosecutors/; Kristy Parker, Prosecute the
Police, THE ATLANTIC (June 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/
06/prosecutors-need-to-do-their-part/612997/. See also Mike Allen, Holder’s Parting Shot:
It’s Too Hard to Bring Civil Rights Cases, POLITICO (Feb. 27, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.
politico.com/story/2015/02/eric-holder-civil-rights-interview-mike-allen-115575 (reporting
that former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder called for lowering the legal standard for
assessing police accountability).
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jurisprudence.307 This contention is argued next in two parts: (1) that the
Court has questioned whether the Government has the right to execute a
person, moving toward abolition of the death penalty, (2) that, in the
meanwhile, the Court has established strict restrictions of the Government’s
taking of a person’s life, and (3) that police use of lethal force policies and
practices do not comply with those strict restrictions. This leads to the
conclusion that such deadly or excessive force policies and practices are
unconstitutional and, therefore must be abolished.
The first point is that both Federal308 and State governments309 believe
the government lacks the constitutional authority to take a person’s life.310
Consequently, the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence reflects this
uncertainty. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,311 the Court struck down capital
punishment statutes, reducing all death sentences pending at the time to life
imprisonment.312

307. “Death penalty,” also known as capital punishment, is a government-sanctioned
practice whereby a person is put to death by the State as a punishment for a crime. See
Defining “death penalty” jurisprudence, supra note 31.
308. Unfortunately, currently capital punishment is currently authorized by the federal
government.
309. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state (visited Aug. 20, 2020)
(reporting that as of 2020, twenty-eight states have the death penalty, with twenty-states and
the District of Columbia have legislatively abolished the death penalty). Four others,
Colorado, Pennsylvania, California, and Oregon have suspended executions by gubernatorial
moratorium. The Nebraska Legislature also abolished capital punishment in 2015, but it was
reinstated by a statewide vote in 2016; see also Staff, Colorado Becomes 22nd State to Abolish
Death Penalty, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 25, 2020, 8:24 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/colorado-death-penalty-abolished-executionsa9423146.html.Additionally, courts in Washington and Delaware recently ruled that the
states’ capital punishment laws are unconstitutional. See generally States and Capital
Punishment, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 24, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-penalty.aspx.
310. See generally John Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s
Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 GEO. CRIM. L. REV. 4 (2012) (providing a detailed analysis
of death penalty jurisprudence, specifically around the contours of under what circumstances
the death penalty is forbidden); The Case Against the Death Penalty, ACLU (2012),
https://www.aclu.org/other/case-against-death-penalty (“The American Civil Liberties Union
believes the death penalty inherently violates the constitutional ban against cruel and unusual
punishment and the guarantees of due process of law and of equal protection under the law.
Furthermore, we believe that the state should not give itself the right to kill human beings–
especially when it kills with premeditation and ceremony, in the name of the law or in the
name of its people, and when it does so in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion.”).
311. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
312. Id. at 240 (declaring that under then-existing laws “the imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments,” after finding that the manner in which death penalty laws had
been applied to be “harsh, freakish, and arbitrary” as to be constitutionally unacceptable).
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Subsequently, in 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,313 the Court affirmed the
legality of capital punishment,314 after many states passed new death penalty
statutes.315 After resuming its reassessment of the constitutional parameters
of the death penalty, the Court has absolutely prohibited the execution of
certain classes of individuals.316 Further, on the procedural front, the Court
decided that juries, not judges, find facts that (1) make a defendant eligible
for capital punishment317 and (2) impose a sentence of death.318 Therefore,
the government continues to assess whether there should be an absolute
abolition of the death penalty, as existed in the past.
The second point is that while reconsidering an absolute abolition of
government executions, the Court has established very strict requirements
on when the Government can constitutionally terminate a person’s life.319
The Court’s Eighth Amendment “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” cases are
the capstone of the death penalty jurisprudence.320 However, the Court’s

313. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
314. Id. (reporting that “the U.S. federal government, the U.S. military, and 31 states have
a valid death penalty statute, and over 1,400 executions have been carried in the United States
since it reinstated the death penalty in 1976”).
315. See generally ACLU, supra note 309 (noting these statutes require a two-stage trial
procedure, in which the jury first determines guilt or innocence and then chooses
imprisonment or death in the light of aggravating or mitigating circumstances).
316. The Court has abolished the death penalty in several instances, ruling that the
execution of such individuals is unconstitutional, violating cruel and usual punishment. See
Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986) (prohibiting the death penalty for insane
persons), in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting execution of mentally
retarded criminals); in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555, 578–79 (2005) (prohibiting the
execution of minors); and in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), for those convicted
of raping a child where death was not the intended or actual result. State courts have also
restricted death penalty executions. See generally Amber Widgery, Debating the Death
Penalty: Capital Punishment Divides Legislators, But Not Along Party Lines, STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan./Feb. 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/2020/
DeathPenalty_JanFeb_2020_SL.pdf. See, e.g., on August 2, 2016, in Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d
430 (Del. 2016), the Delaware Supreme Court struck down the state’s death penalty statute,
ruling that it violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court decision
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). On October 11, 2018, in State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d
631 (Wash. 2018), the Washington Supreme Court also struck down the State’s death penalty,
ruling for the fourth time that it was unconstitutional, finding it “invalid because it is imposed
in an arbitrary and racially biased manner,” and found that the law as applied violates Article
I, Section 14 of the State Constitution because it fails to serve any legitimate penological goal.
317. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
318. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016).
319. See generally Death Penalty/Capital Punishment Law, MEGALAW.COM (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20060614135521/http://www.megalaw.com/top/deathpenalty.php.
320. See Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence:
Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373 (1995) (describing the historical context of
the Eighth Amendment and its application to conditions of confinement for prison reform
litigation); Schlanger, supra note 32 (providing one of the most comprehensive reviews of
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death penalty jurisprudence encapsulates all applicable constitutional and
fundamental rights that protect a person’s life from government
infringement.321
These “pro-sanctity of life” constitutional rights can be categorized in
a five-part process by which the government can legally execute a person:
(1) Rights of the Accused, including a fair trial, pre-trial, speedy trial, jury
trial, counsel, presumption of innocence, exclusionary rule, selfincrimination, double jeopardy, defenses, juvenile status; (2) Verdict,
including conviction, acquittal, not proven, directed verdict; (3) Sentencing,
including mandatory, suspended, custodial, periodic, discharge, guidelines,
totality, dangerous offender; capital punishment, execution warrant, cruel
and unusual punishment, imprisonment, life imprisonment, indefinite
imprisonment, three-strikes law; (4) Post-sentencing, including habeas
appeals, parole, probation tariff, life license, miscarriage of justice,
exoneration, pardon, recidivism, habitual offender, sex offender registration,
sexually violent predator legislation, and (5) Execution, including methods
of execution,322 and humane considerations.323
Relative to the George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code, the Court’s
prescriptions on government’s authority to take a person’s life dictates that
the executions strictly comply with those strict, exacting requirements. Next,

innate litigation including those that pertained to conditions of confinement in violation of the
8th Amendment); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions and the Eighth Amendment,
84 NYU L. REV. 881 (2009) (examining when prison conditions would qualify as either
“cruel” or “unusual” and how cruelty would be captured doctrinally for Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement analysis).
321. See generally RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, ET AL., THE DEATH PENALTY: AMERICA’S
EXPERIENCE WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2007).
322. See CORRECTIONS WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS 4–5 (2011) (noting that in the U.S.
executions are typically done in non-public setting, shielded from public view behind the
walls of the penitentiary). Cf., Steven A. Blum, Public Executions: Understand the “Cruel
and Unusual Punishments” Clause, 19 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 415 (Winter 2019) (describing
the public executions in Florida and in Utah as of 1992).
323. In 2008, in Baze v. Rees, 553. U.S 35 (2008), the Court held that the lethal injection
does not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment, applying an “objectively intolerable” test
to determine if the method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishments. The legality of lethal injection was upheld in Glossip v. Gross, 576
U.S. 863 (2015). See also, GAIL A. VAN NORMAN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS IN
ANESTHESIOLOGY 285–91 (2010) (reporting on a separate study published in The Lancet in
2005 that found that in forty-three percent of cases of lethal injection, the blood level of
hypnotics was insufficient to guarantee unconsciousness). State courts and lower federal
courts have refused to strike down hanging and electrocution as impermissible methods of
execution. See generally David Down & Jeffrey R. Newberry, Conceptual and Scientific
Defects in the Supreme Court’s “Method of Execution” Jurisprudence, 92 YALE J. BIOL MED.
210, 793–803 (2019) (providing a scientific analysis regarding specific methods of execution
which may violate the Eighth Amendment).
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we will examine the contention that the police policies authorizing lethal
force are wrongfully licensing “executions,” subject to the Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence.
The third and most important point is that the police use of lethal force
policies and practices do not comply with the Court’s exacting restrictions
for the taking of a person’s life.324 As previously noted, the Court’s
restrictions go beyond its Eighth Amendment cases. For there to be a
constitutionally-sanctioned execution, the Court requires the following
substantive and procedural safeguards: such an execution must, at the
minimum, (1) follow a conviction of a capital crime, (2) be mandated by a
jury of one’s peers, (3) beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) following postconviction remedies, and (5) in a humane manner of execution.
Many states have eliminated the death penalty as inhumane, noting its
racial implications.325 Even in states where the death penalty is permitted it
remains highly regulated.326 This begets the question, when such strict
regulations regarding executions abound, how can the law permit a police
officer to execute a person without a charge of a capital crime, without
presenting defenses, without a jury of one’s peers, and oftentimes in an
inhumane manner?
The arguments presented for the abolition of the death penalty327 also
apply to support the GFAC’s abolition of death by police killings: (1) police
killings are “unusual” punishment, because the United States is the only
western industrialized nation that engages in this punishment328 and because
only a random sampling of people in the United States are killed by police;329
(2) police killings, like capital punishment, deny due process of law; its
imposition is often arbitrary,330 and always irrevocable—forever depriving
an individual of the opportunity to benefit from new evidence or new laws
that might warrant the reversal of a conviction, or the setting aside of a death
sentence; (3) police killings violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection, as they occur randomly—and discriminatorily, imposed
disproportionately upon those whose victims are Black, often poor and
uneducated, and concentrated in certain geographic regions of the country;331

324. See Jelani Jefferson Exum, The Death Penalty on the Streets: What the Eighth
Amendment Can Teach About Regulating Police Use of Force, 80 MO. L. REV. 987, 1011
(2015) (arguing that a re-conceptualization of the use of the police use of lethal force as
punishment shows that the Eighth Amendment should apply).
325. See supra note 308.
326. Id.
327. See The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 309.
328. See infra Part I.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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(4) police use of lethal force is clearly not a viable form of crime control,
compared to curbing drug use, putting more officers on the street, and gun
control;332 (5) police use of deadly force wastes limited resources,
squandering the time and energy of courts, prosecuting attorneys, defense
counsel, juries, and courtroom and law enforcement personnel, unduly
burdens the criminal justice system, and thus is counterproductive as an
instrument for society’s control of violent crime, and has resulted in higher
insurance premiums to cover the rising cost of wrongful death civil
actions;333 (6) police killings do irreparable harm to the victims (death), to
their families (trauma), to the offending police officer (termination,
suspicion, and potentially jail time), and to policing (damaged community
relations);334 (7) police brutality demonstrates a lack of respect for human
life, as Black lives matter and as all life is precious and as death is
irrevocable, murder is abhorrent, and a policy of state-authorized killings is
immoral, epitomizing the tragic inefficacy and brutality of violence, rather
than reason, as the solution to difficult social problems.
In summary, the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence protects a person,
particularly a Black person, from being executed by the police use of lethal
force. This is a more appropriate application of a constitutional principle over
the current Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence. The
ongoing controversial and highly publicized police killings of Blacks sends
a message that our society does not respect life, when it permits its officials
to deliberately kill human beings. These killings are executions, a violent
public spectacle of official homicide, and one that endorses killing to solve
social problems—the worst possible example to set for the citizenry, and
especially children. Overall, there are no good legal or policy reasons to
support lethal force policies or practices, but the bloodshed and the resulting
destruction of community decency are real.
* * *
The George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code is a constitutionally mandated
solution to the unequal justice, which results from the Court’s three doctrines
that compose the Blue Shield. As analyzed in this section, the GFAC
achieves five points, (1) it embraces the sanctity of life (2) it protects
particularly vulnerable Black lives, (3) it bypasses the Blue Shield by
focusing on the unconstitutionality of the authority of police to use lethal
force, (4) it complies with the strict constitutional restrictions on the

332.
333.
334.

Id.
See The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 309.
See infra Part I.
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government’s authority to execute a person’s life, and (5) it properly
categorizes the use of lethal force as an execution, subject to the Eighth
Amendment. In addition to these bases of the Code, it addresses the
conscious and unconscious negative impact of systemic racism, the Blue
Code, which is discussed next.
B. Systemic Racism
In addition to the Court generated Blue Shield protection, police
officers are also protected by the “Blue Code”—the combination of a
protective police culture and systemic racism that provides additional
safeguards for police officers who use lethal force. The Blue Code is
composed of six components that combined create a nearly impermeable
barrier to police accountability, (1) police officers are protected from
criminal liability by an unofficial but real code of silence, in which police
officers guard each other from outside criticism, including misconduct.335 (2)
police officer misconduct is staunchly defended by the Fraternal Order of
Police (“FOP”), a national police union,336 which provides officers with legal
counsel to defend them in investigations and lawsuits,337 (3) police officers
have broad authority to investigate themselves, through their internal affairs
division,338 (4) the principles of comity and federalism give local prosecutors

335. Robert M. Myers, Code of Silence: Police Shootings and the Right to Remain Silent,
26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497, 505 (1996).
336. Paul Butler, Commentary, Why the Fraternal Order of Police Must Go: The Nation’s
Largest Police Organization does more Harm to Public Safety than Good, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Nov. 11, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/ 10/11/whythe-fraternal-order-of-police-must-go.
337. Noam Scheiber, et al., How Police Unions Became Such Powerful Opponents to
Reform Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/us/policeunions-minneapolis-kroll.html; Steven Greenhouse, How Police Unions Enable and Conceal
Abuses of Power, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ newsdesk/ how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses; Don Gonyea, Labor Leaders Call for
Police Reform Even As Police Unions Face Growing Criticism, NPR (June 10, 2020 3:49
PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874096421/labor-leaders-call-for-police-reform-asthey-face-criticism-for-police-union-tie; Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and
Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Street, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2014), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unions-keep-abusive-cops-on-th
e-street/383258/; Christopher Ingraham, Police Unions and Police Misconduct: What the
Research Says about the Connection, WASH. POST (June 10, 2020 7:54 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/police-unions-violence-research-george-floyd/.
338. See Naomi Creason, Police Departments Often Investigate Themselves in Non-Lethal
Use-of-Force Incidents, THE SENTINEL (Apr. 19, 2015), http://cumberlink.com/news/
local/police-departments-often-investigate-themselves-in-non-lethal-use-of/article_5af2e65
d-ff32-5451-9c52-adaa7eb758f2.html; Sheila McLaughlin, What Happens When Officers
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jurisdiction to prosecute fatal shootings pursuant to local or state laws,339 (5)
the grand jury process has also been shown to be pro-police and antiBlacks,340 and (6) if a police officer is indicted for committing a homicide,
that officer will benefit from a pro-police jury.341 Relative to the pro-police
juries, these jurors are often white, middle class, suburban citizens who see
the police as guardians of the American way of life.342 They bring to a trial
a pro-police, anti-Black bias, which often results in the acquittal of the police
officer suspect.343
Those components of the Blue Code result in faulty, biased
investigations of the alleged wrongful use of lethal force. This is also
inclusive of tainted evidence and police cover-ups.344 Hence, due to these

Use Deadly Force?, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2014, 2:49 P.M.), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2014/02/21/police-deadly-force-accountability/5697611/.
339. See generally Flanders & Welling, supra note 206; Jason Hanna, No Charges Against
Officers in Alton Sterling Death; Other Videos Are Coming, CNN (Mar. 27, 2018, 6:22 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/27/us/alton-sterling-investigation/index.html;
David
A.
Graham, Most States Elect No Black Prosecutors, THE ATLANTIC (July 7, 2015),
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/american-prosecutors-are-incredible-white
does-it-matter/397847/.
340. See Andrew Siff et al., Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Eric Garner
Chokehold Death, NBC NEW YORK (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:59 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/
news/local/grand-jury-decision-eric-garner-staten-island-chokehold-death-nypd/1427980/;
Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America: Direct
and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Remedies for Victims of Police Brutality When the
Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV. 271, 296–97 (1994); see also Roger A.
Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified Police Killings—
Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397, 410 (2017) (recommending
reforms of the grand jury system for cases involving police use of lethal force).
341. See Maura Dolan, California Prosecutors Routinely Strike Black and Latino People
from Juries, Report Says, L.A. TIMES (last updated June 15, 2020, 11:02 am), https://www.
latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-15/prosecutors-strike-black-latino-jurors-report.
342. Janell Ross, How Big of a Difference Does an All-White Jury Make? A Leading
Expert Explains, WASH. POST (May 30, 2016 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/30/how-big-a-difference-does-an-all-white-jury-make-a-lead
ing-expert-explains/.
343. See Samira Puskar et al., 3 Chicago Officers Acquitted of Covering Up for Colleague
Who Shot Laquan McDonald, NBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/us-news/chicago-officers-found-not-guilty-attempted-cover-laquan-mcdon
ald-killing-n959411; Phoebe Ellsworth, et al., Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt
and Dispositional Attributions, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 11, 1367-79 (2000);
Ashish S. Joshi et al., Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual
Consequences, ABA (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/comm
ittees/diversity-inclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individualconsequences/.
344. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE USE OF FORCE: AN EXAMINATION OF
MODERN POLICING PRACTICES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/11-15Police-Force.pdf.
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six components of the Blue Code, there is usually a finding that the use of
force was justified, with reliance on the testimony of the police officer who
committed the shooting.345
Relative to the principles of comity and federalism, the typical
investigation and charges are primarily a matter of local control and pursuant
to local or state laws.346 As local prosecutors work closely with and rely on
the cooperation of police officers in prosecuting other criminal matters, they
arguably face unresolvable conflicts of interest in investigating and
prosecuting police for alleged misconduct.347
The Blue Code functions as the ultimate protection of police
misconduct, as it reflects and supports systemic racism.348 It also condones
the policies and practices that in most states and under common law rules,
permit police to use deadly force when the officer reasonably believes a
suspect poses a significant threat of serious bodily injury or death to
themselves or others.349 Some states have the use of deadly force statute
included within a larger use of force statute, while others cover deadly force
in their “justifiable homicide” statute, which applies to both law enforcement
officers and private citizens.350
Relative to systemic racism, the federal government has investigated
several police departments’ lethal force policies and practices.351 These
investigations concluded that the use of excessive lethal force was prevalent

345. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Police Shootings, Race, and the Fear Defense, NEW
YORKER (July 12, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/benjamin-wallace-wells/policeshootings-race-and-the-fear-defense. See generally Creason, supra note 339.
346. Id.
347. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 5, 128, 150–51, 180–81 (2009); Angela J. Davis, Justice for Michael Brown
Rests Almost Entirely in the Hands of This One Man, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 18, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/119123/ferguson-missouri-prosecutor-does-he-have-toomuch-power; Simone Weichselbaum, The Problems with Policing the Police, TIME,
http://time.com/police-shootings-justice-department-civil-rights-investigations/ (last visited
Apr. 28, 2019); Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447
(2016).
348. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Barr Says There Is No Systemic Racism in Policing, N.Y.
TIMES (June 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/us/politics/justice-departmentbarr-racism-police.html.
349. That also applies to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon when the officer believes
escape would pose a significant threat of serious bodily injury or death to members of the
public. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 2.
350. Id. at 2, 9, 21.
351. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 93; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Calls for Changes
in Policing After Task Force Report, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/03/us/politics/obama-calls-for-changes-in-policing-after-task-force-report.html
(reporting that President Obama said that requiring independent investigations when the
police use lethal force, would be “controversial”).
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in some police departments along with patterns of civil rights violations.352
In response, the federal government sued several local police departments
and negotiated consent decrees to ensure police accountability.353 In 2017,
these investigations of police departments were halted by the President
Donald J. Trump Administration,354 likely erasing years of positive police
reforms.355
Therefore, the Blue Code and systemic racism work hand in hand to
ensure that white police officers are seldom, if ever, found guilty for killing
Black people, which leads to the question, is this failure of equal justice
deliberate?

352. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 23
(2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download (finding Chicago police officers
have a pattern of using excessive force). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S COMMUNITY POLICING REPORT 2015-2016 3 (2017), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/press-release/file/925431/download; Matt Stroud et al., A ‘Pattern or Practice’ of
Violence in America, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/
graphics/2015-doj-and-police-violence/.
353. See Jerry Abramson, 10 Cities Making Real Progress Since the Launch of the 21st
Century Policing Task Force, WHITE HOUSE (May 18, 2015, 7:26 PM), https://www.white
house.gov/blog/2015/05/18/10-cities-making-real-progress-launch-21st-century-policingtask-force; Accomplishments Under the Leadership of Attorney General Eric Holder, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/doj/accomplishments-underleadership-attorney-general-eric-holder (“Since 2009, the Department has opened more than
20 investigations state and local law enforcement agencies regarding civil patterns or practices
in violation of the Constitution or federal law… the largest number of law enforcement
agencies being reviewed at any one time in the history of the Department.”); cf. Sarah
Wheaton et al., Police Union Accuses White House of Politicizing Cop Safety, Obama
Administration Has Announced Plan to Restrict Police Forces’ Access to Military Gear,
POLITICO (May 18, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/white-houselimiting-military-equipment-for-police-118041 (noting opposition to the Obama
Administration’s proposed changes from the nation’s largest police union).
354. Then U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that “in recent years, . . . law
enforcement as a whole has been unfairly maligned and blamed for the crimes and
unacceptable deeds of a few bad actors.” U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE NEWS, ATTORNEY
GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS DELIVERS KEYNOTE REMARKS AT THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF CHIEFS OF POLICE DIVISION MIDYEAR CONFERENCE, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-keynote-remarks-international-association-chiefs
(last updated Apr. 11, 2017).
355. See John Byrne et al., Concerns Mount over Chicago Cop Reform as Sessions Vows
to ‘Pull Back’, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2017, 5:30 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/politics/ct-emanuel-sessions-consent-decree-react-met-20170228-story.html;
Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring Troubled Police
Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/jeffsessions-crime.html?_r=0; Pete Williams, AG Sessions Says DOJ to ‘Pull Back’ on Police
Department Civil Rights Suits, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 1:52 PM), http://www.nbcnews.
com/news/us-news/ag-sessions-says-trump-administration-pull-back-police-department-civ
il-n726826.
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C. Lynching
To appreciate the Black Lives Matter Movement, this Article critically
analyzes the context of the white police officers’ killings of Blacks in light
of the State-sanctioned violence and the State deprivation of the human
rights and dignity of all Blacks, which is discussed next.
Previously, this Article contended that the police use of lethal force
violates the victim’s protection against Cruel and Unusual Punishment. In
what follows, this Article argues that the abuse of that right is more suspect
when the perpetrator is a white male police officer and the victim is a Black
person. As such, the police killing of Blacks in such a blatant, unabashed,
and authorized manner constitutes modern-day lynching and is a key
component of systemic racism.356
This section begins with an analysis of lynching and its role in racial
oppression. Lynching was often used throughout our Nation’s dark history
to kill, punish, and subrogate Black people.357 Usually, this was in a violent
public display, where whites terrorized and traumatized Blacks in order to
enforce racial subordination and segregation.358
Certain elements must be present for a lynching. Specifically, it is (1)
an act of violence; (2) under the pretext of administering justice without trial,
(3) an execution of a presumed offender; (4) with use of torture and corporal
mutilation; and (5) to instill fear and to promote white supremacy.359
Further, lynching or “lynch law” is where a self-constituted court imposes a
death sentence on a person without due process of law.360
356. Martin Luther King III, a leading Black Lives advocate, concluded that when a police
officer kills a Black person, that officer is acting illegally as judge, jury, and executioner. See
Andrew Naughtie, George Floyd Death: Martin Luther King III Says Police Acted as ‘Judge,
INDEPENDENT
UK
(June
1,
2020),
Jury
and
Executioner’,
THE
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/george-floyd-martin-luther-king-sonpolice-riots-bbc-interview-a9542151.html.
357. See also EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE
LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR (3d ed. 2017), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/lynch
ing-in-america-3d-ed-080219.pdf (documenting more than 4,400 racial terror lynchings in the
United States during the period between Reconstruction and World War II).
358. Over the years, lynching was frequently supported by various State and federal law
enforcement officials, and traumatized Blacks throughout the country. Even to this day,
Congress has not been able to enact an anti-lynching statue. See Tal Kopan, Sen. Kamala
Harris’ Anti-Lynching Bill Caught in Police Reform Fight, S.F. CHRONICLE (June 23, 2020,
6:59 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Kamala-Harris-anti-lynching-billcaught-in-15361078.php.
359. See Geoffrey Abbott, Lynching, Mob Violence, BRITANNICA, https://www.britan
nica.com/topic/lynching (“Lynching, The term ‘lynch law’ refers to a self-constituted court
that imposes sentence on a person without due process of law.”).
360. See id. (noting the terms derived from the name of Charles Lynch (1736-96), a
Virginia enslaver of people of African descent).
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The contemporary police killings of Blacks exhibit all of the elements
of a lynching. Specifically, they are (1) act of violence, whether by shooting
or chokehold; (2) committed under the pretext of administrating justice such
as responding to a person who is resisting arrest; (3) executing a presumed
offender, such as a presumption that George Floyd knowingly passed a
phony twenty dollar bill; (4) with the use of torture such as kneeling on
George Floyd’s throat for nearly nine minutes, while handcuffed and lying
on his back; and (5) to instill fear and to promote white supremacy as seen
in the political fallout in support of the police’s actions.361
The Black Lives Matter Movement has emphasized that the police
killing of Blacks is a key component of systemic racism, which makes Black
lives less valued in our society.362 In addition to those killings, the legal
system continues to support and reflect centuries of overt and unconscious
racial oppression and discrimination against Blacks, particularly males.363
Systemic racism is evidenced by the financial disparities in the Black
community.364
The criminal justice system plays a key role, if not the key role, in
systemic racism. That includes mass incarceration,365 a broken criminal

361. Zack Beauchamp, What the Police Really Believe: Inside the Distinctive, Largely
Unknown Ideology of American Policing and How It Justifies Racist Violence, VOX (July 7,
2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/7/7/21293259/police-racis
m-violence-ideology-george-floyd.
362. See supra note 15. See, e.g., Christina Pazzanese, The Fire This Time, THE HARVARD
GAZETTE (June 2, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/06/lawrence-d-boboexamines-police-killings-of-black-men/; Lydia Denworth, A Civil Rights Expert Explains the
Social Science of Police Racism, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (June 4, 2020),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-civil-rights-expert-explains-the-social-scienceof-police-racism/.
363. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Critical Perspectives on Police, Policing, and Mass
Incarceration, 104 GEO. L. J. 1531 (2016) (positing that the imprisonment of AfricanAmerican men is one means by which society removes minority populations from mainstream
life).
364. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Opinion, The Black-White Wage Gap Is as Big as It Was
in 1950, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/opinion/racewage-gap.html (reporting that recent research indicates little progress since the Truman
administration).
365. The United States incarcerates two million people, which is more than any other
country. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (10th ed. 2010).
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justice system,366 racial disparities,367 and the economic devastation of
communities of color.368 Relative to policing, there are many features of
systemic racism including: capital punishment,369 racial profiling,370
institutional racism,371 unconscious bias,372 mass incarceration,373 the war on
drugs,374 reform of the criminal justice system,375 the criminalization of
misdemeanors,376 and discriminatory over-policing,377 shooter bias
366. See also Peter Wagner et al., Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, PRISON
POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html (last
visited July 22, 2019) (cautioning that “being locked up is just one piece of the larger pie of
correctional control. There are another 840,000 people on parole (a type of conditional release
from prison) and a staggering 3.7 million people on probation (what is typically an alternative
sentence). Given the often-onerous conditions of probation, policymakers should be cautious
of ‘alternatives to incarceration’ that can easily widen the net of criminalization to people who
are not a threat to public safety.”).
367. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 689 (2016) (noting “[d]espite that legalization, marijuana usage continues to
disproportionately impose serious consequences on racial minorities, while white
entrepreneurs and white users enjoy the early fruits of legalization.”).
368. See Candace Caruthers, When the Cops Become the Robbers: The Impact of Asset
Forfeiture on Blacks and How to Curtail Asset Forfeiture Abuses, 62 HOW. L.J. 277 (2018);
Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors Prison, 65
UCLA L. REV. 2 (2018).
369. See, e.g., Daniel G. Bird, Note, Life on the Line: Pondering the Fate of a Substantive
Due Process Challenge to the Death Penalty,” 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2003); Matthew
R. Doherty, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The Retroactive Application of Laws in
Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 445 (2004).
370. See, e.g., End Racial Profiling Act of 2015, H.R. 1933, 114th Cong. (2015),
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 22, 2015, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1933; Carbado & Rock, supra note 58.
371. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, Symposium, Whren at Twenty: Systematic Racial Bias and
the Criminal Justice System, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 923 (2016).
372. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson et al., Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 115 (2016); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias
in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013).
373. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 362 (positing that the imprisonment of Black men is
one means by which society removes minority populations from mainstream life).
374. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or
Why the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381 (2002).
375. See, e.g., Michele L. Jawando & Chelsea Parsons, 4 Ideas That Could Begin to
Reform the Criminal Justice System and Improve Police-Community Relations, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civilliberties/report/2014/12/18/103578/4-ideas-that-could-begin-to-reform-the-criminal-justicesystem-and-improve-police-community-relations/; Dukanovic, supra note 51.
376. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1055 (2015).
377. See L. M. VAN HET LOO ET AL, CANNABIS POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES
(2003) (stating that statistics show that controlling cannabis use leads in many cases to
selective law enforcement, which increases the chances of arresting people from certain
ethnicities. For example, while Blacks and Hispanics constitute about twenty percent of
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studies,378 and masculinity studies.379 Further, Blacks, particularly males,
are disproportionally unemployed,380 under-educated,381 and underpaid even
when overeducated.382
This Article contends that the George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code is a
compelling response to the constitutional protection against “cruel and
unusual punishments,” which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. This
contention is based on the premise that police policies and practices on using
lethal force constitute modern-day lynching; that they are State-sponsored
executions and, therefore, subject to the strict requirements in death penalty
cases.
* * *
Despite the overwhelming constitutional and policy bases for banning
police use of lethal force, there are critiques to such an approach. Next, this
section briefly responds to two positions against the proposed solution, the
GFAC. The first critique is that police killings are not executions and,
therefore, are not subject to death penalty jurisprudence. The second
criticism is that the GFAC strips police officers of the means to protect
themselves and others from imminent threats to their lives and the lives of

cannabis users in the U.S., they accounted for fifty-eight percent of cannabis offenders
sentenced under federal law in 1994).
378. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1314–29 (2002); Saul Miller et al., The Basis of Shooter Biases: Beyond Cultural
Stereotypes, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1358 (2012) (finding that participants
with strong beliefs about interpersonal threats were more likely to mistakenly shoot outgroup
members than in-group members).
379. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, America’s Police Culture Has a Masculinity Problem,
THE CONVERSATION (July 19, 2016, 6:07 AM), https://theconversation.com/americas-policeculture-has-a-masculinity-problem-62666.
380. See, e.g., Black Male Millennial Unemployment and Mental Health, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Aug. 2018), https://www.apa.org/advocacy/health-dispariti
es/black-male-unemployment.pdf; Katelyn Burns, The Unemployment Rate Improved in May,
But Left Black Workers Behind, VOX (June 6, 2020 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2020/6/6/21282611/black-workers-left-behind-unemployment.
381. See generally Dionne Rosser-Mims et al., Swimming Upstream: Black Males in
Adult Education, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ADULT AND CONTINUING EDUCATION (No. 144, 2014).
382. See generally Michelle F. Davis, Black and White on Wall Street: The Unwritten
Code on Race, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2020, 5:00 AM), (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2020-06-29/rules-of-working-on-wall-street-from-black-employees-who-lived-it?u
tm_campaign=news&utm_medium=bd&utm_source=applenews; Dion Rabouin, The Myth
of Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Through Education, Axios (June 29, 2020), https://
www.axios.com/racial-wealth-gap-ten-myths-d14fe524-fec6-41fc-9976-0be71bc23aec.html.
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others. Each critique is accompanied by a response, which provides how the
benefits of the solution outweigh its possible shortcomings.
First, some critics of the GFAC might argue that it is fatally flawed
because it is based upon the premise that the police lethal force policies and
practices constitute an “execution,” subject to Eighth Amendment death
penalty jurisprudence. Accordingly, this Article contends that unjustified
use of lethal force by police officers is a wrongful infringement of the right
to life and should be abolished. If, following the abolition, a police officer
uses lethal force, that officer will be judged as an ordinary citizen, without
the protection of qualified immunity or Fourth Amendment search and
seizure jurisprudence. To be more explicit, if after abolition, a police officer
is accused of an unjustified shooting of a person, the GFAC seeks to shift the
burden of proof to the police officer who uses lethal force to prove the force
was factually justified, in response to a threat on his life or on the lives of
others.
Second, some critics of the GFAC argue that the GFAC strips police
officers of the legal right to defend themselves and others from imminent
threat. The answer is even with the abolition of the use of lethal force, police
officers would still have the right to self-defense under state laws. Simply,
the GFAC allows for the use of State self-defense laws.383 Furthermore, if a
police officer reasonably believed his or her life, or the life of another, was
being threatened at that time, then the officer is freed from civil liability for
the use of lethal force.384 This is consistent with the doctrine of qualified
immunity, which protects officers from civil liability in instances where
“their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”385 Following the
enactment of the GFAC, a police officer who uses lethal force would not be
protected by the qualified immunity doctrine.
Therefore, the GFAC is both constitutionally mandated and good public
policy. Contrary to critics, the GFAC does not leave officers totally
defenseless. The GFAC does not incorrectly assume that the police use of
lethal force is a State-sponsored execution and does not unduly put police
officers’ lives at risk. Neither of these allegations negates the positive impact
of the GFAC in protecting the sanctity of life. Instead, the GFAC subjects
police officers to the same standards and defense of an ordinary citizen.

383. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of
Property, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 401–07 (2007) (providing state constitutional
provisions that expressly state that the right to defend life is a constitutional right, either as
inalienable, inherent, natural or God given).
384. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (civil action for deprivation of rights).
385. See infra Part III, A.

BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS

68

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 48:1

Conclusion
It is time to end the reign of terror against Blacks and abolish the
unconstitutional, reckless police use of lethal force. The George Floyd AntiLynching Code is a necessary solution to redress the Blue Shield and the
Blue Code, which operate to systemically protect and condone the use of
lethal force. Currently, the system creates a double standard, one for the
public and another for police officers, sparking a demand for equal justice.
Further, the fact that police officers are rarely prosecuted for killing
Blacks raises vexing questions about the morality and constitutionality of the
police officers’ authority to use lethal force. That reality creates a
challenging conundrum for Black Lives Matter advocates on how to save
lives while promoting community policing. Consequently, notwithstanding
the Black Lives Matter Movement, police officers will continue to kill
Blacks; unless we embrace a transformative intervention.
The continuous struggle for equal justice is supported by the sanctity of
life principles found in the Constitution. This Article challenges the current
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which focuses on the regulation of police use
of lethal force, over the sanctity of life. It defends the principle that if the
State has the constitutional authority to take a life, such a punishment must
comply with very strict constitutional constraints, as provided by the Court
in its death penalty jurisprudence protection against “cruel and unusual
punishment,” under the Eighth Amendment.
If Black lives matter, and they do, then we must redress systemic
racism—by eradicating racist policies and practice from policing. By
immediately abolishing the police use of all lethal force tactics, particularly
shootings and chokeholds, we will save the lives of all Americans and prove
that Black lives really do matter.
Without the GFAC, we will continue to repeat the question, “Do Black
lives really matter?”386 Without the GFAC, we will continue to suffer from
the horrific cycle of additional police killings, followed by anger, more
protests, and riots—“no justice, no peace.”

386. Tim Arango, In Los Angeles, the Ghosts of Rodney King and Watts Rise Again, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/us/rodney-king-george-floydlos-angeles.html; Anjuli Sastry & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted in Anger: A Look
Back at the Rodney King Riots, NPR (Apr. 26, 2017 1:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodney-king-riots;
Jennifer Medina, The L.A. Riots 25 Years Later: A Return to the Epicenter, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/us/la-riots-rodney-king-south-central-19
92.html.
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* * *
Addendum I: The George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code (the
“GFAC”)
As noted in Part II of the Article, the following is a proposed code that
the government, courts, and policymakers should adopt to provide past,
present, and would-be victims of police use of lethal force with the protection
ensured to them by the U.S. Constitution.
A. Overview:
Recognizing the symbiotic relationship between the police and the
community, any solution to reform police practice seeks to reach two
interrelated goals: (1) to protect persons from the use of lethal force by police
officers, and (2) to renew public confidence in the integrity of policing.
To achieve these goals, it is proposed that the government, at all levels,
including Congress, the federal judiciary, and the Executive branches, as
well as state and local governments, absolutely prohibit the police use of
lethal force. Specifically, it views such force as an execution and a modernday form of lynching.
The Constitution, public policy, and morality demand that police
officers be banned from using lethal force. Further, equal justice demands
that an offending police officer be held criminally liable, contrary to
qualified immunity and current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Specifically, it requires that any police officer who kills a person be judged
as if that officer were acting as an ordinary citizen, without the benefit of
qualified immunity. It also mandates a thorough, federal investigation and,
where appropriate, prosecution of all incidents of police use of lethal force.
To behave otherwise would arguably violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, under the Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments, the government has a solemn and sworn
duty to act to protect the private citizen against all wrongful governmental
infringements of the fundamental right to life.
The legislative solution is proposed herein as the George Floyd AntiLynching Code (the “GFAC”), which provides as follows:
B. The Provisions
Whereas, there is a cultural and political shift relating to the police use
of lethal force;
Whereas, there are ongoing efforts at every level of government to
address the negative impacts on our criminal justice system, including racial
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inequities, wasted resources in the policing, prosecution, and incarceration
of such offenses in crowded prison conditions, and the collateral
consequences of these offenses;
Whereas, systemic racism has produced negative, collateral damage to
the lives of millions of Americans, creating a second-class citizenry;
Whereas, African Americans have been victims of racial injustice for
centuries and suffer continuous harm by such past criminalization,
imprisonment, or collateral consequences of having a criminal record;
Whereas, African Americans have been victims of centuries of racial
injustice have and continue to be harmed by such past criminalization,
imprisonment, or collateral consequences of having a criminal record and
there is a recognized need to reconcile these past racial injustices;
Whereas, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a right to be protected
against Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the death penalty, pursuant to the
Eighth Amendment;
Whereas, the U.S. Constitution embraces the fundamental principle of
the sanctity of life, with due process protection against wrongful
infringement and the substantive due process through the penumbra of the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution;
Whereas, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the government from killing a person, without due
process and in a humane manner;
Whereas, a police officer’s use of lethal focus violated the due process
of a person, as it is an execution without a trial by jury, legal representation,
and the presumption of innocence;
Whereas, incidents of police use of lethal force negatively impact the
policing function, creating distrust between police and the communities they
serve;
Whereas, existing federal legislation creates a federal crime when a
state actor wrongfully takes the life of a citizen; and
Whereas, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress
the authority to enact this legislation.387
Therefore, It Is Hereby Pronounced that the GFAC provides as follows:
(1) All levels and branches of government, to the highest extent of their
powers and authorities, are hereby mandated to abolish all forms of use of
lethal force. This mandate is self-evident and does not require supplemental
action other than the immediate endeavors needed to facilitate these
requisites.

387. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
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(2) The Justice Department is hereby mandated to investigate each and
every death of any person in the custody or under investigation or arrest by
the police.
In the GFAC, the term “lethal force,” shall be defined as the amount of
force deployed by a police officer that is likely to cause either serious bodily
harm or death to another person, or actually causes serious injury or death to
another person. Examples of mechanisms of lethal force includes, but is not
limited to, shooting of firearms, chokehold, strangulation, stun guns aka
tasers, shooting rubber bullets, attack dogs, the injection of ketamine,
aggravated assault, simple battery, no-knock raids, and failing to come to a
person’s aid in a timely manner.
The GFAC shall be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The legal standard
for assessing criminal liability shall be whether the police officer who used
lethal force did so in self-defense and/or in response to imminent lethal harm
to another. The police officer will be considered innocent until proven
guilty. This statute does not change the mens rea element needed to prove a
case of murder or involuntary manslaughter or other criminality under state
or local laws.
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